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Abstract
In this thesis, I write about the theory of contracts and auctions. In the first two
chapters, I study the principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. The first chapter
focuses on the matching between principals and agents, while the second analyzes the
implications of the agent having a chance to fix a potential bad outcome before it is
revealed to the principal. Finally, in the third chapter, my coauthor and I model first-
price sealed-bid auctions, from an ex-ante perspective, to help bidders prepare bids in
practice. We study how asymmetries in valuation, information, and sophistication of
rivals affect the optimal strategy.
Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Moral Hazard, Matching, Auctions.
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Chapter 1
Wealth and the Principal-Agent
Matching1
1.1 Introduction
Wealth can play a major role in the design of optimal incentives, and therefore in the
matching between principals and agents. In order to study the compensation of these
agents, it is fundamental to understand how they will endogenously match with the firms
they end up working for,2 and the specific role that the characteristics of the contracting
parties play in it. I propose a model in which risk neutral agents, characterized by their
wealth and talent, match with firms (principals), characterized by their size, to perform
a task and in the presence of moral hazard. This model allows to study the contracts
being signed by the parties, and the implications that wealth brings to the matching
for the traditional results of positive assortative matching between talented agents and
1I have to thank comments from Steffen Hoernig, Guido Maretto, Cláudia Custódio, Patrick Rey,
Fernando Anjos, Alper Nakkas, Patrick Legros, Takashi Akahoshi, Daniel Cardona, and Antoni Riera.
I also appreciate comments and suggestions from participants at the following seminars/conferences:
Nova SBE RG, Nova SBE IRW, UECE Lisbon Meetings 2017, DEA-UIB.
2Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) shows the pervasive effects of neglecting the endogenous matching
when studying incentive contracts empirically.
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bigger firms.
Wealth can affect the agent’s behavior, and the optimal contract, in two different
ways: through the agent’s risk aversion or through limited liability. While the scarce
literature studying the effects in compensation focused on the former (Chade and de Se-
rio, 2014, Thiele and Wambach, 1999), this article concentrates on the latter. Limited
liability prevents the principal from selling a high participation in the company to the
agent in order to achieve an output closer to the one without information asymmetries.3
Having this in mind, I raise the question: How do principals and agents match? In par-
ticular: Do wealthier agents match with larger firms or the opposite? Can be wealth
and talent be assigned to agents in such a way that the positive assortative matching
of talented agents working in bigger companies does not hold?
Even though the empirical literature studying the matching between principals and
agents has focused on the agent’s talent as the main driver, wealth, through limited
liability, can play a major role.4 It is a standard result in the moral hazard literature
that under asymmetric information the principal can achieve the first best level of
effort with a risk neutral agent that is not cash constrained, allowing the principal to
define negative transfers to the agent in case of bad outcomes, or as the traditional
interpretation indicates, an up-front cash payment from the agent to the principal.
This can be observed for example in the franchise model, or in the cab business. This
scenario is not common in the corporate world (see Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988)).
This can be due to the lack of wealth from the agents to make the transfers, legal or
social limitations, or it can be simply interpreted in a different manner, for example as
3Shetty (1988) studied the effect that limited liability has on the contracts between tenants and
landlords.
4Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006), to my knowledge, is the only that explicitly considered the role
of wealth in a traditional principal-agent matching setup. However, they consider homogeneous prin-
cipals, while I allow for heterogeneous principals. I also allow for agents to differ in talent. Legros and
Newman (1996) considers a problem of matching agents of the same type with different wealth levels,
that get together to form firms between them. Wealth plays an important role in this.
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an obligation for the executives to buy shares from the company. Other professions do
face these kind of contracts more explicitly. For example, lawyers, when promoted to
partners, must buy their partnership with money from their own pockets. Physicians,
in some countries, must buy a participation in the clinics where they receive their
patients. In general any kind of partnership will involve transfers from the agents to
the principal.
As mentioned, in the absence of limited liability the principal can set up a contract
that achieves a first best outcome, by selling the firm to the agent for the whole expected
surplus leaving the agent without any information rents. This is no longer true once the
agent is cash constrained. I focus my study on how this channel affects the matching
between agents and principals. In a first stage I study the isolated version of the
principal-agent model, finding that the principal’s utility increases in matches with
wealthier agents, whereas the agent’s utility increases by working in bigger firms. This
suggests that a positive assortative matching is to be expected, that is wealthier agents
should work in bigger firms.
Because utility is not perfectly transferable in the principal-agent model, as the
sharing of the surplus affects the strength of the incentives, it is necessary to use the
concept of generalized increasing differences, introduced by Legros and Newman (2007),
in order to analyze the matching. Doing so, requires to study carefully the utility
possibility frontier (UPF) that arises from the model. After doing that, I find that
there is positive assortative matching (PAM) between principals and agents where the
types for principal is the firm size, and the agents’ is their wealth. The same PAM is
valid when the agents’ type is their talent: more talented agents work for bigger firms.
Then I describe the contracts that each pair will sign and the expected output they
will produce. I also consider gains in efficiency (by generating contracts closer to the
first best for some matches) that are generated by the market pressure introduced by
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competition, that is, the fact that other principals could offer more convenient contracts
to my own agent. In particular, I provide conditions under which high-type principals
give larger incentives to their agents than what they give in the isolated version of the
model. For this market pressure to be effective, though, firms should have similar sizes.
Finally I give an example in which a wealthy agent has lower skills than a poor
one, a situation in which generalized increasing differences may not hold anymore, and
therefore, neither needs to hold the positive assortative matching between principals
and agents when considering talent as the agent’s type. This situation can be less rare
as expected, as if talent is similar, the correlation between talent and wealth can be
less clear. This situation can also apply to agents in the beginning of their careers.
As a consequence, the assumptions made on the correlation between wealth and talent
are critical to claim that, for example, there is positive assortative matching between
bigger companies and more talented agents.
In Section 1.2 I describe and solve the baseline principal-agent model I use in this
article, to proceed with the analysis of the utility possibility frontier and the matching
analysis in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4 I provide an example of a distribution of wealth
and talent in which the positive assortative matching does not hold. Finally, in Section
1.5 I present a discussion on how this model fits the literature, to conclude in Section
1.6.
1.2 The Principal-Agent Framework
In this section I develop a slightly modified version of the classical model of moral
hazard with risk neutral agents.5 The modifications I introduce allow to capture the
effects of different levels of cash constraint for the agent and the size of the firm in the
5See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Laffont and Martimort (2002), and Salanié (2005) for exam-
ples.
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optimal compensation scheme and welfare allocation, by parameterizing the model in
the firm’s size, agent’s wealth, and the agent’s talent.
Both principal and agent are assumed to be risk neutral. I assume that the firm’s
output x can have two states, x ∈ {0, ξ}, where ξ ∈ [0, 1] reflects the firm’s size.6 The
agent’s effort e can be chosen between 0 and 1, and affects positively the probability
of success — having x = ξ as the outcome — in the following way: Pr(x = ξ|e) =
p(e) = e.7 Let a and b be the base wage and the bonus respectively. Although a is
paid independently of the outcome, b is paid by the principal only if x = ξ is observed.
Effort is costly for the agent, and is represented by the cost function c(e) = e2/(2τ).
Here τ ∈ (0, 1) measures the ability - or talent - of the agent: a higher τ implies lower
effort cost. Assume that the reservation utility for principal and agent are 0 and u
respectively.8 Let u be the maximum between 0 and whatever he can get by working
somewhere else. Also assume that the agent has personal wealth ω ≥ 0. The agent’s
cash constraint is therefore determined by −ω, meaning that the principal can never
set wages such that the agent transfers more than ω to her.
First, the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent, specifying the base
wage and the bonus for success; the agent accepts or rejects the offer; conditional on
accepting it, he decides how much effort to exert. Finally the outcome is realized and
the principal makes the transfer to the agent.
The maximization problem of the principal is given by:
6Considering ξ as a parameter allows to use it as firm size. For example in Gabaix and Landier
(2008), the authors mention that variables such as earnings or capitalization can be considered as firm
size, and Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun (2015) consider the number of employees as firm size.
Given the characteristics of this single-period model, defining size as the earnings in the good state
avoids the inclusion of more variables that would needlessly complicate the model.
7The parameterization of the model in the other variables makes the constraint for effort, to be
lower than 1, not binding.
8By the nature of the problem, I consider the reservation utility for the agent to be the minimum
change in utility he is willing to accept. Note that if the reservation utility u is included in the
participation constraint, for the risk neutrality, it can be canceled out.
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max
e,a,b
− a+ p(e)[ξ − b] (1.1)
s.t. a+ p(e)b− c(e) ≥ u (PC)
e ∈ arg max
ê
{a+ p(ê)b− c(ê)} (IC)
a ≥ −ω (CC)
Equation (PC) is the participation constraint that ensures that the agent will ac-
cept the contract proposed by the principal.9 Equation (IC) represents the incentive
compatibility constraint that ensures that the agent will choose endogenously what the
principal has chosen as optimal effort, and finally (CC) represents the cash constraint.
Usually in the literature (CC) is represented as a ≥ 0 to model a cash-constrained
agent, or in other words, a situation with limited liability. In this article, instead, we
allow for different levels of wealth.
The solution to this problem depends on the value that ω takes. In fact, it is well
known in the moral hazard literature that if ω is high enough (and this will be shown
in the model as well), the principal can achieve first best effort with a contract that is
equivalent to selling up-front the outcome to the agent.10 Doing so, he can extract the
whole expected surplus, minus u.
When solving the problem not all the constraints are going to be binding. If the (CC)
is too severe, then the (PC) is not binding. Conversely if the agent has large wealth,
and/or a high reservation utility, one finds that only the (PC) is binding. There are
intermediate cases in which both constraints are binding, and the solution is given by
9The participation constraint would be indeed ω + a + p(e)b − c(e) ≥ u + ω, as the agent’s utility
depends on his own wealth and on his outside option, but ω cancels out on both sides.
10First best refers to the situation in which there is no asymmetry of information between the agent
and the principal.
1.2. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK 7
the system of equations provided by the constraints of the problem. Because this model
is quite standard in the literature I leave its detailed derivation for Appendix A.1 and
directly present the main results in Table 1.1. The utility of the principal is represented
by v, whereas the agent’s utility is represented by u.
Binding Constraint
Variable (CC) (CC) and (PC) (PC)

























u+ ω u+ ω
E[∆u] −ω + ξ2τ
8
u u













(u+ ω)2τ − u− ω ξ2τ
2
Table 1.1: Solution to problem in (1.1). ∆u and ∆ Surplus represent the induced
changes in both variables.
It can be immediately observed that when only (PC) is binding the first best can
be implemented, by selling the firm to the agent at his reservation utility minus the
expected surplus, and letting him keep the whole outcome (b = ξ). The agent receives
utility u and the implemented optimal level of effort is ξτ . When only the (CC) is
binding, the agent obtains information rents, defined as whatever the agent obtains
above his reservation utility. The optimal effort is reduced to half when compared to
the first best and the surplus has dropped by 25%. What happens in between? The
agent gets utility u as the (PC) is binding, and also a = −ω, as the (CC) is binding.
Note that a lower value of ω implies an increase in the fixed wage that would lead the
agent to increase his utility; nevertheless, a decrease in ω leads also to a decrease in
the bonus and the implemented effort, keeping the agent at his reservation utility level.
The principal, though, is strictly worse off, as less is being produced and she keeps a
share of a smaller surplus.
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The conclusions of this simple principal-agent model can be summarized as:
1. The higher the agent’s wealth, the larger has to be the firm for him to be consid-
ered cash-constrained.
2. If cash-constrained, the agent’s information rents decrease with his personal wealth.
3. The bigger the firm, the larger the set of agents that are to be considered cash-
constrained.
4. The larger the firm the (weakly) higher the bonus for the agent and the expected
utility for principal and agent, however the bonus is (weakly) lower as a share of
the firm’s profits.
5. If the agent is not cash constrained the firm is indifferent as to the level of agent’s
wealth and the outcome is first best.
Baker and Hall (2004) finds, in an empirical work, that the size of the bonus for
the agent is smaller, as a percentage of the firm, the bigger the firm. This is consistent
with point 4. The model predicts that when the agent is cash constrained, the bonus b
is linear or constant on the firm’s size, and therefore there is a decreasing relationship
between the share of profits the agent is keeping and the size of the firm.
We haven’t focused on the comparative statics of τ . However it is worth mentioning
that the results are in line with the findings in the literature (Gabaix and Landier,
2008) in the sense that more talent leads to greater compensation.
Two results are to be learned from this. First an agent would always like to work for
a firm in which he is cash constrained, as he can extract more surplus. A good way to do
that is to work in a big company, as this makes him more cash-constrained, for a given
ω, and also increases his expected utility, as he is getting a share of a bigger surplus.
On the other hand, a firm would like to hire wealthy agents (or less cash-constrained
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or even better an agent that is not cash-constrained at all), as then the principal can
keep most or all of the surplus. For the principal, how wealthy the agents needs to
be for her to be able to keep the whole surplus, depends on the size of the firm: the
smaller the firm, the less wealthy the agent needs to be, and therefore smaller firms
would be indifferent between less and more wealthy agents, as long as both could buy
the firm. The agent, however, will always look for bigger firms to work for. This result
is consistent with the findings of Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006).
1.3 The Utility Possibility Frontier and the Match-
ing
In this section we will study assortative matching between principals and agents. In
a broad sense we have assortative matching when the matching between economic
agents is determined by their types. For example, in our case, a result of positive
assortative matching (PAM) implies that wealthier agents match with bigger firms.
Negative assortative matching (NAM) means exactly the opposite, i.e., that wealthier
agents work in smaller firms. It is useful to remind the reader at this point that I
have defined u as the maximum between 0 and the agent’s outside option. Now the
outside market option is going to be an input in the utility possibility frontier (UPF),
and describes how much utility the agent is obtaining with a particular contract.
In the previous section, I provide arguments suggesting that PAM is a reasonable
matching outcome to expect when the agent’s type is wealth. When the agent’s type is
talent, it is considered standard in the literature that more talented agents match with
higher types of principals. Consistently with the assumption in the previous section,
that the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent, I assume here that there
are more agents than principals.
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It can be shown that the surplus of a match is supermodular, in the above model, in
the principal and agent’s types, which quite often is enough to have PAM in a matching
problem with transferable utility. However, in the principal-agent setup, utility is not
perfectly transferable. In a contract, the principal can find many ways to transfer utility
to the agent, and the case of perfectly transferable utility would be simply a money
transfer to the agent (a higher fixed wage a). This is not an optimal alternative for
the principal. She will instead set a higher bonus b, incentivizing the agent to exert
a higher level of effort, and thus increasing the surplus. The transfer of utility to the
agent is financed in part by giving up a share of the surplus, but also by the increase
of it, so the utility loss for the principal is lower than the gains in utility for the agent.
Legros and Newman (2007) [LN henceforward] introduced a methodology to address
the matching problem when utility is not perfectly transferable. They consider a match
between individuals type R and S. Let s > s′ and r > r′ be two different types within
each category, and the outcome be a match between an individual from R with another
individual from S. They argue that r is going to match with s if r can outbid r′ for
s. In particular, they introduce the concept of generalized increasing differences (GID)
which relies on the utility possibility frontier (UPF) in order to determine the matching
between individuals. The UPF describes the combinations of utilities u and v that are
Pareto efficient.11 For the sake of consistency I will use the same notation for the UPF,
outlined in the following definition:
Definition 1. Let θ = (ω, τ) be the agent’s type, and ξ be the principal’s type. The
utility possibility frontier is described by the following functions:
• Let φ (ξ, θ, u) be the maximum utility that a principal type ξ can obtain when
matching with an agent of type θ, and this agent gets utility u.
11That is, neither principal nor agent can have higher utility without the other being worse off.
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• Let ψ (θ, ξ, v) be the maximum utility that an agent type θ can obtain when match-
ing with a principal of type ξ, and this principal gets utility v.
Thus, φ and ψ represent the UPF from the points of view of the principal and agent
respectively, and for a bijective UPF and given types, one is the inverse of the other,
with respect to utility levels.
The main result in LN - that GID implies PAM - intuitively states that the low
type principal, for any level of utility he can get by matching with the high type agent,
will provide a certain utility level for each type of agent (high or low type). In order
for the high type principal to keep the high type agent, she should be able to outbid
the other principal, that is, to provide at least as much utility to the high type agent
as he would receive from the low type principal. This will only occur if the principal
gets more utility by providing that utility to the high type agent than what she would
get by giving the low type agent what he gets from the low type principal. By doing
this the high type principal can outbid the low type principal and PAM will arise as
the market outcome.
In the model with only one principal and one agent, developed in section 3, it has
been highlighted that, for the optimal contract, there are 3 possible situations: only
(CC) is binding, only (PC) is binding, or both (CC) and (PC) are binding. The (IC)
is always binding. From table 1.1, we can write down an analogous table for the UPF
(Table 1.2).
CC PC & CC PC
E[∆u] = ψ(ω, ξ, v) ξ
2τ
8
− ω u u





(u+ ω)2τ − 2u− ω ξ2τ
2
− u
Table 1.2: Utility Possibility Frontier.
The situation when only the (CC) is binding represents a single point on the UPF.
This happens because the agent is getting a fixed rent, and the (PC) is not binding.
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If we want to move to the right along the UPF we need to give higher utility to the
agent, and then the (PC) starts binding. The (CC) is binding until the unconditional
transfer a implied by when only (PC) is binding exceeds −ω (in other words, (CC)








or when looking at the UPF, when u ≥ ξ2τ/2 − ω. For all the values of u ∈
[ξ2τ/8− ω, ξ2τ/2− ω], both constraints are binding. Of course the case can appear in
which ξ2τ/8 ≤ ω, or even ξ2τ/2 ≤ ω, nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, I assume that
the agent cannot obtain negative expected utility, and therefore u ≥ 0. In particular
for the UPF I assume that u = 0.
What is different to the usual UPFs is that this UPF’s domain varies with ω, τ and
ξ. For example, when ω is small, it considers values of u that are strictly positive. This
represents a small variation with respect to LN’s UPF, as they assume that its domain
is between 0 and some upper bound for both individuals. On the other hand, a bigger
company, or a more talented agent increases the expected value of the company, making
an agent cash constrained, and therefore creating information rents. To address this
fact, I define the following correspondences:
Definition 2. Given the UPF, define:
• uθ(ξ) := max{0, ξ
2τ
8
− ω} as the minimum level of utility that an agent of type θ
can get from a match with a principal of type ξ.
• Vξ(θ) := [0, φ (ξ, θ, uθ(ξ))] as the feasible utility levels that an optimal contract can
give to a principal whose firm has size ξ contracting with an agent of type θ. By
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definition, Vξ(θ) is also the domain of ψ (θ, ξ, ·).
• Uξ(θ) := [uθ(ξ), ξ
2τ
2
] as the set of feasible utility levels that an optimal contract
can give to an agent of type θ working for a firm of size ξ. By definition, Uξ(θ)
is also the domain of φ (ξ, θ, ·).
In Figure 1.1 I draw the UPF for different levels of ω. The upper dotted line
represents the surplus in the first best, whereas the lower dotted line represents the
surplus when only the (CC) binds. Both lines have a slope of −1. In Figure 1.2 I
repeat the same exercise but changing the value of τ instead.
The left and right solid points rest over the second and first best surplus respectively.
Specifically the left dot represents the contract in a second best when only the CC is
binding, whereas the right dot represents the principal giving away the firm for free to
the agent. The solid line represents sections of the UPF when the principal has sold the
firm to the agent in exchange of some fixed fee. The dashed line represents the UPF
when both constraints, CC and PC, are binding.
By increasing the agent’s wealth, the UPF expands upward until it reaches the
first best surplus. As the utility for the agent increases, the principal implements the
contract indicated by the system of the three constraints CC, PC, and IC. At the same
time, the higher the utility for the agent, the more relevant the PC becomes compared
to the CC, and therefore the solution gets closer to the first best outcome. Here, the
principal is selling cheaper a share in the outcome and therefore the agent, for the same
price, is obtaining more of the outcome, hence exerting more effort. If the agent has
some wealth, the principal will decide, once the agent is receiving a high amount of
utility, just to sell the whole firm for whatever wealth the agent has. By moving along
the UPF to the right, the principal will sell the firm cheaper, increasing the utility
received by the agent.
As the agent gets wealthier, the principal selling the firm to the agent happens
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Figure 1.2: UPF for different levels of τ .
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sooner in the UPF, that is, for lower values of ∆u. In the extreme case when the agent
has enough wealth to pay the whole surplus, the principal will be able to write the first
best contract and extract the whole surplus.
On the other hand, when the agent has a fixed amount of wealth, increasing his
talent will cause the value of the firm, in first and second best outcomes, to increase.
This of course is good for both (the share he is receiving increases, and the share of the
principal increases as well), however there is a caveat. The more valuable the firm is,
the relative wealth, that is the amount of wealth the agent has compared to the value of
the firm (ξ), is decreasing, and therefore the agent with more talent is relatively more
affected by the CC than a less talented agent. We can observe in Figure 1.2 how by
increasing the level of τ the agent moves from a situation in which he is unaffected by
the cash constraint, and therefore a first best outcome is always achieved, to another
in which he is considerably cash constrained, up to a point where information rents are
created. Let us start with a benchmark result.
Fact 1. If talent is homogeneous among the agents, and they are wealthy enough such
that they are not cash constrained for any firm, then nothing can be said about how
firms and agents are going to match.
Proof. If the poorest agent is rich enough to buy the biggest firm, the principal will
always set up a first best contract, and therefore will sell the firm exactly at its surplus.
For the agents, then, all the firms represent the same utility, that is zero, and therefore
are indifferent between them. For this reason, any kind of matching can arise.
Fact 1 represents the simplest case, in which always first best contracts are written
and the principals are able to extract the whole surplus of their firms. Putting this case
out of the way, we can study more interesting situations.
In order to look for GID or PAM in this model, I will refer to Corollary 1 in LN,
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where they use the assumption that φ is twice differentiable to obtain PAM, by looking
at the signs of its second derivatives. There is a caveat though: in our model φ is not
twice differentiable. In Appendix A.2 I discuss that for LN’s corollary, it is enough
for PAM that φ is differentiable in ξ, and that this derivative is increasing in u and
the agent’s type. These conditions establish that the gains of a principal by matching
with a higher type counterpart are greater (a supermodularity condition) than when
matching with lower type counterparts, plus that for higher values of utility given to
the agent along the UPF, these gains also increase. This will ensure that the high type
principal can outbid the low type principal for the high type agent.
Lemma 1. The UPF described by φ (ξ, θ, u) is:
• Continuous and strictly decreasing in u for u ∈ Uξ(θ).
• Differentiable in u for u ∈ int(Uξ(θ)).
• Differentiable in ξ.
Proof. To prove continuity it is enough to verify that φ (ξ, θ, ξ2τ/8− ω) = ω + ξ2τ/4
and that φ (ξ, θ, ξ2τ/2− ω) = ω. Both are verified using simple algebra.
Every piece of the UPF is differentiable in u. Therefore, it is sufficient to verify
that the derivatives coincide when the function changes its functional form. At the first
best surplus (and therefore in that section of the UPF) the UPF has slope −1. The
derivative of the UPF when PC and CC are binding is (ξ
√
2τ(u+ ω))/(2(u+ ω))− 2.
After replacing u = ξ2τ/2− ω we obtain −1, and then the UPF is differentiable in the
interior of Uξ(θ). The part of the UPF in which only the CC is binding is a point, and
lies in the minimum value of utility the agent can get from the matching, and therefore
does not belong to the interior of Uξ(θ).
Finally, as the function is continuous and every piece of it is strictly decreasing in
u, the UPF is decreasing in u.
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Now analyzing ∂φ/∂ξ, we need to study again its intervals. φ written as a function
of ξ is:
























Using simple algebra it can be shown that this function is continuous in ξ. Moreover,
taking the derivatives in each piece, and replacing the boundaries of each piece of the
function, it can also be verified to be differentiable in ξ.
Lemma 1 is instrumental in the construction of the proof of the final proposition. It
says that the UPF is well behaved and follows a standard principle: The more utility
is given to the agent, the less utility the principal will obtain.
Lemma 2. ∂φ/∂ξ is continuous and increasing in τ , ω, and u.
For the proof of Lemma 2 please refer to Appendix A.2. This is the first stone
to build up the supermodularity type of characteristics for φ in order to obtain PAM.
Further, it is necessary that φ does not decrease in the agent’s type, nor ψ decrease in
the principal’s type. This is formalized in the following lemma,
Lemma 3. φ (ξ, θ, u) and ψ (θ, ξ, v) are type increasing, that is:
• φ is non decreasing in ω and τ .
• ψ is non decreasing in ξ.
Proof. From Table 1.1 it can be seen that, at least piece-wise, both φ and ψ are non
decreasing in ω or τ the former, and ξ the latter. Continuity of φ and ψ in each of the
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relevant variables, which is easily shown, is sufficient then to obtain the type increasing
property.
Lemma 3 shows that the surplus increases when increasing ω, τ , or ξ, formalizing
what can be observed in figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 in which the UPF shifts upward when
increasing any of those parameters. This implies that for any level of u that is feasible,





Figure 1.3: ξ′ < ξ, ω ∈ [0, ξ̃2τ
8
] with ξ̃ ∈ {ξ′, ξ}
Proposition 1. The economy with principals and agents with moral hazard satisfies
generalized increasing differences in (ξ, ω) and (ξ, τ), which implies that:
• For equally talented agents, larger firms will match with wealthier agents.
• For equally wealthy agents, larger firms will match with more talented agents.
Proof. Given that the function φ is differentiable in ξ (Lemma 1), the fact that Lemma
2 ensures that ∂φ/∂ξ is non decreasing in τ , ω, and u, and that Lemma 3 shows that
φ and ψ are type increasing, Corollary 1 in (Legros and Newman, 2007, p.1097) can be
applied, as the requirements for its proof are satisfied, and therefore PAM is obtained
for both matches. For a detailed proof refer to Appendix A.2.
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Additional results with discrete types
Wealthier agents will work in bigger firms, and more talented agents will also work
in bigger firms. However, what is the equilibrium going to look like? Finding how
principals and agents will construct their contracts is not simple, as an equilibrium
would imply that everyone is maximizing their expected utility by matching with their
partner, and no other principal steals the agent of another one. This means not only
that the match is stable, which is implied by GID, but that the contracts signed by each
party can be clearly identified. The conclusions of GID can be applied to a continuum
of firms and agents, as well as for a discrete set of them. For simplicity, I will focus in
what is left of this article on working with the discrete case.
Proposition 2. Let θ = (ω, τ) and θ′ = (ω′, τ ′) be the types of two consecutive agents
such that ω′ ≤ ω and τ ′ ≤ τ . One coordinate (τ or ω) is equal among all the agents,
whereas the other (ω or τ) is strictly larger. Let ξ′ < ξ bet the sizes of two consecutive
firms. The equilibrium outcome must satisfy:




v∗ = φ (ξ′, θ′, u∗)
• Otherwise, let ṽ be the utility of the low type principal. The high type match will
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obtain:
u∗ = max{ψ (θ, ξ′, ṽ) , uθ(ξ)}
v∗ = φ (ξ, θ, u∗)
Proof. The first part of the proposition is trivial, as by GID no principal would want
to outbid the lowest type principal for the lowest type agent, and therefore there are
no incentives for the lowest type principal to provide more utility than the minimum
possible, that is uθ′(ξ
′).
For the second part, assume that u∗ = ψ (θ, ξ′, ṽ). Note that if the high type
principal were to offer less than u∗, say u∗ − 2ε, then the low type principal could offer
u∗− ε and be strictly better off because the UFP is strictly increasing in θ. By offering
higher utility to the high type agent, she outbids the high type principal for the high
type agent. If u∗ = uθ(ξ), the same reasoning applies, as it is sufficient that the high
type principal offers enough utility to the agent to avoid the outbidding from the low
type principal.
In a 2 by 2 world, that is two principals and two or more agents, the low type match
will write down a second best contract as if they were in an isolated situation, whereas
the high type match will write down a contract that provides the agent at least as
much utility as the high type agent would obtain with the low type principal, when
this principal is getting his second best utility when matching with the low type agent,
that is, when the low type principal is unable to outbid the high type principal for the
high type agent.
Proposition 3. Consider consecutive matches of firms of size ξ′ < ξ, and agents with
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types θ′ < θ, such that only ω or τ is equal for all the agents, and for every match, the
agents are cash constrained for both firms.
If difference in wealth or talent is large enough, i.e. if:
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, when the agents’ type is talent.
Then the high type match will write a contract with stronger incentives than the
contract it would write out of the market, and therefore closer to the first best output.
Proof. Let ξ′ < ξ, ω′ ≤ ω and τ ′ ≤ τ with only one of these two last inequalities being
strict. Let v′ represent the utility the low type principal obtains by matching with the
low type agent, and assume both agents are cash constrained for both firms. From













where ∆ω = ω − ω′ and ∆τ = τ − τ ′. If the contract of the high type match is
equivalent to the one they would write out of the market, then the high type agent
would receive ξ2τ/8 − ω. The conditions in the proposition come from comparing the
utility level in (1.3) against this last expression.
Proposition 3 states the conditions such that the competitive pressure imposed by
the market makes the high type match write a contract that provides incentives in
which the outcome is closer to the first best, compared to the expected outcome in
the one-to-one version of the model, reflecting the efficiency brought by competition
into this economy. The first part of Proposition 3 says that when the agents’ type is
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wealth, then the more talented they are, and the more different in size are the firms,
how much different wealth between high and low type agents needs to be, in order for
the competitive pressure to be enough to motivate the high type principal to strengthen
the incentives for the high type agent. Note that a bigger firm makes the agent more
cash constrained, increasing the information rents, and therefore decreasing the need of
more compensation to avoid outbidding from the low type principal (as part of this cost
is already covered by the higher information rents). This explains, then, the necessary
increase in the wealth of the high type agent compared to the low type to have a
contract that provides him more than the information rents.
The second part of Proposition 3 says that when the agents’ type is talent, and
the size of the smaller firm is less than half of the size of the big one, then for any
relationship of talent between the agents, there is no competition enough to make the
high type principal to provide extra incentives to the high type agent. However if
ξ′ ≥ (
√
2/2)ξ, then for any pair τ ′ and τ the contract written by the high types is going
to give the high type agent more information rents than what he would obtain with the
high type principal in the absence of market pressure.
The conclusions of Propositions 3 and 4 go in line with the literature, in the sense
that market pressure (competitive factors) can increase the difference in expected com-
pensation among the agents more than the difference in the information rents created
by the firm size.12 This would explain why concentrated distributions in talent, for ex-
ample, can lead to dispersed distributions of compensation as found by Terviö (2008).
12Because the agents are risk neutral, this is equivalent to gains in expected utility.
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1.4 Wealth, Talent and the Matching
I have shown that the economy described in this work satisfies positive assortative
matching when the agent’s type is either talent or wealth. This suggests that if talent
and wealth are positively correlated, that is, more talented agents have higher amounts
of wealth, indeed positive assortative matching will arise. However, there are situations
in which this does not necessarily happen. In particular, for young agents, their wealth
is not correlated with their talent but maybe their cash constraint is influenced by
their networks or their family wealth, so the question that remains is: Does positive
assortative matching with respect to talent holds for all joint distributions of the agents’
talent and wealth?
The corporate finance literature (Terviö, 2008) considered positive assortative match-
ing between agents and principals when considering talent and size as their types. I
exploit the model introduced in this article to analyze the impact that wealth can have
on the matching between principals and agents. In other words, are there distributions
of wealth and talent among agents that could compromise the PAM with respect to
talent? Can wealthier but poorly talented agents match with big firms at the same
time that talented and poorer agents end up working in small firms?
In Figure 1.4 we observe a graphical representation of the UPF to look for GID
or GDD,13 following Legros and Newman (2007). In detail, we compare four possible
matches: In the upper half of each vertical axis we consider the big firm matching with
the agents, whereas in the bottom half we consider the small firm matching with the
agents. The left half considers the poor but talented agent matching with the firms,
whereas the right half considers the wealthier but not so skilled agent matching also
with the firms as well. Each axis represents the utilities of each actor, and the curves are
13LN define generalized decreasing differences (GDD) as a sufficient condition for negative assortative
matching (NAM), where the lower type principal can outbid the high type principal for the high type
agent.
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the UPF derived from each matching. For simplicity I assume that the poor agent has
ω = 0, whereas the rich agent has ω > 1, which ensures that he is cash unconstrained
with any firm.
∆u|(ω′, τ) ∆u|(ω, τ ′)
v|ξ′
v|ξ
(a) τ − τ ′ < τ .
∆u|(ω′, τ) ∆u|(ω, τ ′)
v|ξ′
v|ξ
(b) τ − τ ′ ≥ τ .
Figure 1.4: Assessment of the bidimensional matching between agents and principals.
We observe (Figure 1.4a) that when having a poor but skilled agent against a rich
but less capable agent we might no longer have PAM with respect to talent and firm size.
This happens when the difference in their talent is below some threshold (τ − τ ′ < τ).
Furthermore, if we start assuming a level v as reservation profits for the firms, then
we can even end up with negative assortative matching when considering firm size and
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agent talent, if rich agents have poor skills and poor agents are talented. Conversely, if
the difference in talent between the two agents is sufficiently high (Figure 1.4b), then
the effect of the limited liability becomes irrelevant, and positive assortative matching
between talent and firm size arises.
Note that where the UPF intersects the horizontal axis (the agent’s change in utility)
only changes with τ and ξ, whereas ω is crucial to determine where the UPF reaches
the maximum value for φ (the principal’s utility). Because of this, if we analyze the
matching between both of the agents, (ω,τ ′) and (ω′,τ), with a firm of a given size,
then the poorer agent will always have the bottom of his UPF to the right of the UPF
generated by the matching of the wealthier one. However, if the difference in talent is
small, the poorer agent’s UPF will reach a lower maximum (the isolated second best
contract outcome) on the vertical axis than the UPF of the wealthier agent (the first
best outcome, of a slightly smaller outcome because of the lower talent). This crossing
of the UPFs is critical, as the firms prefer one agent or the other, depending on how
much utility they will have to provide to the agent in order to make the matching stable.
The UPFs will cross if and only if the difference in talent is low enough.
1.5 Discussion
The model studied in this paper provides a simple framework to study the implications
of the matching between principals and agents, when we consider, besides talent, the
wealth owned by the agents. Doing that, on the one side we obtain predictions for
future empirical work, with a model that considers the effects of endogenous matching.
On the other, the model replicates some empirical findings in the literature of executive
compensation. In this section I will expand on these two points.
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Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006) takes the principal-agent model, with moral hazard,
into the matching framework. They conclude that market conditions, such as competi-
tion for jobs or competition for workers, are critical to determine the market outcome.
A key similarity with this work is the consideration of wealth as the agent’s type, the
consideration of non-perfectly-transferable utility between principal and agents, and
the introduction of the effects of wealth through the limited liability channel. A key
difference, though, is that they consider homogeneous principals while I let principals
to differ in the size of their projects. I also let the agents have their talent as another
type. These differences allow to consider a much wider range of scenarios, and instead
of answering who is working (or who is hiring), they allow to answer the question of who
is working where. Letting talent be part of the model, allows to contrast the conclusions
with a wider set of empirical literature, and check if there are crossed implications, as
the agent’s could have a multidimensional type.
Earlier, Legros and Newman (1996) set up a general equilibrium model in which
agents with different levels of wealth get together to form a firm. They find that wealth
plays a crucial role in defining the type of firms that are going to be formed, in particular
in the presence of moral hazard (when monitoring costs are nontrivial).14 In this article,
instead of studying firm formation, I try to model the environment in which empirical
compensation studies are based on, such as, firms hiring executives. I do so, by letting
the market to be two-sided, differentiating firms from agents. Furthermore, in the
model presented in this article, agents are endowed with talent as well. Both articles
share, though, characteristics such as risk neutrality and wealth playing a crucial role
in the matching of agents through the limited liability channel.
The empirical literature on compensation, has started to incorporate some degrees
14This market is closer to the one presented in Lucas (1978), in which the market is one-sided,
and economic agents might assume different roles in the resulting organizations. In a more recent
work Eeckhout and Kircher (2018) expands this matching concept by allowing the firm to choose
endogenously how many and how skilled are those workers.
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of matching and moral hazard. Of particular relevance are the works of Gabaix and
Landier (2008) and Terviö (2008), which provide interesting conclusions relating the
variables that might drive the matching between executives and firms. Gabaix and
Landier (2008) present a model of CEO and firms matching, based on the distribu-
tion of the CEOs’ talent. They assume that compensation is based on talent, while
firms and CEOs are differentiated between them in size and talent respectively. Their
main theoretical contribution is how compensation on talent reacts to the talent dis-
tribution, reaching the conclusion (supported by their data) that even highly similar
talented CEOs can show big differences in their wages. They also conclude that bigger
firms lead to higher wages in equilibrium. Terviö (2008) on the other hand, develops a
matching model that tries to obtain the distribution of CEO’s ability from the known
distribution of pay and firm’s market value. The author concludes, among other im-
portant insights, that the wide differences in compensation for a small distribution of
CEO’s ability is given by firms characteristics. It happens as well that competitive fac-
tors are crucial to explain the huge differences in compensation levels among managers.
Again, Terviö (2008) neglects moral hazard problems, and neglect any impact wealth
might have on the the design of incentives. An important lesson though is the effects
competition has in the level of wages. The model introduced in this article provides a
theoretical ground for these findings. The more similar the agents and firms, the latter
needs to pay more to keep the high type agents agents, otherwise, smaller firms could
outbid the bigger ones for them. This competitive effect generates efficiency gains,
which reflects in higher expected surplus.
Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) expands the framework of Gabaix and Landier
(2008), by incorporating the agency problems within a competitive assignment model.
They conclude that the compensation, as a share of the firm, is decreasing in firm size,
and they evaluate the effectiveness of incentive compensation, a result that can also be
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replicated in the model introduced in this article. Moreover, in their conclusions they
raise a question that relates directly with this article: Are CEO incentives increasing in
wealth? They refer to this problem and the impossibility to solve, at least empirically,
given that there is no information on absolute wealth for the CEO, and it is only possible
to obtain the wealth inside the firm, in terms of stocks and options. This is one of the
things that Baker and Hall (2004) tried to address. They were trying to investigate
the relationship between CEO’s compensation with the firm’s size. To do this they
developed a single and multitask agency problem, and find the optimal compensation
scheme for the CEO. They later estimate their model focusing on understanding how
the marginal effect of a manager depends on the firm’s size. An interesting finding is
that the CEO’s bonus decreases, as a share of the company, with the firm’s size. They
do not use a matching model as the previous article, nevertheless this result is confirmed
by the model presented in here. The authors use wealth to determine the risk aversion
only, given a firm size, and later make three assumptions that allow them to proxy
wealth in three different ways: first they assume that wealth is proportional to total
annual compensation, later they assume that wealth is the CEO’s holding in the firm
(options plus stock), and finally they assume that CEOs of big firms aren’t richer nor
poorer than CEOs of smaller firms. For us, this is not the case, as the agent’s wealth
is key to determine 1) if the agent is cash constrained, and 2) if it is cash constrained,
how much information rents can the agent extract.
1.6 Conclusions
The model developed here allows to understand some implications of the traditional
moral hazard framework on the matching between principals and agents. In particular
I focus on the effect of the agent’s wealth on his relationship with firms of different
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size. I show that, with risk neutral principals and agents, wealth makes the agent cash
constrained for a lower amount of firms (the smaller ones), and further, if he is not cash
constrained, his information rents decrease with his wealth, and increasingly so in the
firm’s size. Another result is that the size of the firm, measured in earnings, increases
both: agent and principal’s utility and compensation. Therefore a first conclusion is
that the agent would prefer to work in big firms, for which he would be cash constrained
and therefore able to extract information rents. On the other hand, firms prefer to hire
wealthier agents, as this would allow them to reduce the information rents the agent
can extract from the surplus. This is true only as long as the agent is cash constrained.
This will happen for higher levels of wealth, the higher size of the firm, or conversely,
for a given size of the firm, for lower levels of wealth. If the firm is small, the principal
can do just fine with poorer agents, as less wealth from their side is required to keep
them from being cash constrained.
In order to tackle the question of how principals and agents match, I adapt the
techniques developed in Legros and Newman (2007) and use generalized increasing
differences to obtain endogenous positive assortative matching between principals and
agents when considering the firm’s size and the agent’s wealth or talent. I also describe
conditions on the parameter space to describe the contract associated to each match,
and its efficiency. In particular I find that when types are closer, the market pressure is
higher and makes the high type match to set up a contract that creates a higher surplus
than that which could be obtained in a 1 to 1 situation. I also find that the lowest type
will always write a contract that is equivalent to an outside the market outcome, when
principals retain the bargaining power.
Finally I provide an example in which a poor agent with high talent, and a wealthy
agent with poor talent, match with firms of different size. I find that if the difference in
talent is small, then there will be no positive assortative matching with respect to talent
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and firm size. However, if the difference between the agents’ talent is sufficiently high,
PAM is maintained. Considering that wealth is not necessarily perfectly correlated with
talent in a sample with similar agents, this can be an issue for empirical considerations.
In particular, given that Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) has already shown the negative
impact that neglecting the matching considerations can have on empirical results.
Chapter 2
Hunting with two Bullets:
Moral Hazard with a Second
Chance1
2.1 Introduction
In real life we can think of many situations in which principals face agents who, while
unable to hide the outcome, can hide the way it was achieved (for example, when and
how much effort was exerted). The agent may have ways to achieve the outcome that
are completely unknown to the principal when offering the contract.
In this paper, I introduce a moral hazard model in which the agent takes sequential
decisions. In the beginning, the principal offers a contract, which is contingent on the
final outcome. Later the agent exerts effort, observes the outcome of his effort, and
1I have to thank comments from Steffen Hoernig and Guido Maretto, Fernando Anjos, Igor Cunha,
Pedro Vicente, Armin Schmutzler, Patrick Rey, Tobias Kretschmer, Stéphane Gauthier, Patrick Legros,
and Bernhard Eckwert. I am also grateful for the useful discussions with the participants in the Nova
SBE RG, the QED Jamboree 2016, the ASSET Annual Meeting 2016, and the PEJ 2018 Annual
Meeting.
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in case the outcome is bad, can decide to exert further effort in an attempt to obtain
a better outcome. A key piece of the model is that effort is cumulative, that is, the
probability of success is higher the more effort has been exerted in total.
This setup allows us to consider different situations. For example, the agent might
at first exert low levels of effort, with the hope of having a good outcome, and knowing
that in case this bet goes wrong, he will have another chance to work hard and increase
the chances of delivering. Consider the example of a honey dealer buying from cheap
low reputation suppliers. If he has enough time until delivery, he might gamble with the
cheap suppliers, and buy from more expensive and reliable suppliers only if he received
low-quality products from the cheap ones. This decreases the chances for the principal
observing a good outcome, when compared to going to the good suppliers from the
beginning, as the agent has a higher probability of success, and higher chances to fix a
unlikely bad outcome.
The extra chance is, however, not necessarily a bad thing for the principal. Indeed,
it might even reduce the cost of effort, by introducing the option of gambling at first.
In this article, I show that the principal, under certain conditions, designs contracts
that make the agent gamble even in scenarios without moral hazard. However, moral
hazard increases the agency costs significantly compared to the standard agency model
(it is easier for the agent to hide what his actions are because of his larger set of
options). I show that these facts create non-convexities and non-monotonicities in the
implementation of effort as a function of its cost.
Finally, I study the case where the extra chance represents an undesired activity,
which can trigger later a punishment to the principal if caught. I show that if the
penalty is big enough, the principal will never contract a strategy involving gambling
(no effort and later trying to fix an adverse outcome). As the agent does not suffer
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the consequences other than the cost of the extra chance,2 the agency costs increase
substantially in the regions where gambling is the agent’s best response, and therefore
no effort is contracted in a broader set of parameters than in the case without the
punishment.
In Section 2.2, I review the literature that relates to the problem presented in this
paper. In Section 2.3, I present the baseline model with its efficiency implications.
Then, in Section 2.4, I describe how a cost for the principal, of having used the second
chance, affects the implementation of strategies involving the use of that extra chance
with and without moral hazard. Finally, I conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Related Literature
The traditional framework used in moral hazard consists on an agent that has to per-
form a task for a principal, and the principal cannot observe the effort exerted by the
agent. For that reason, the principal sets a payment schedule contingent on the out-
come. Examples of this can be found for example in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005),
Laffont and Martimort (2002), and Salanié (2005). The model introduced in this paper,
incorporates a second chance to exert effort by the agent, before the principal observes
the outcome.
The literature so far has a set of different branches to which this model can relate.
In particular, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) introduced a pure moral hazard model in
which the agent has to exert effort a number of times before the principal compensates
him. In their work the authors’ model has the following timeline: in each of the N
periods of the game the agent has to exert effort, and after each of those periods there
2“The Justice Department has lost the will and ability to prosecute top corporate execu-
tives. They focus on settlements with corporations for money...”, Jessie Eisinger in an inter-
view with Knowledge@Wharton on August 2017 - http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-
wrongdoing-executives-are-rarely-prosecuted/.
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will be an instant realization that cannot be obscured by the agent. At the end of the N
periods, the principal will be able to observe the whole history of realizations and then
proceed to compensate the agent. They conclude that the optimal contract involves
aggregation of realizations and linear compensation on this aggregated performance
along with constant effort from the agent. While they were pointing to show that not
always it is necessary to use all the information to reach optimal compensation schemes
and that sometimes simple functions, as observed in the real world, turn out to be
optimal solutions for the principal, I focus more on the behavior of the agent trying
to exploit the fact of having more than one period to achieve a final output, and I do
not provide more information to the principal than a single outcome. Besides, in my
framework effort is cumulative, and the agent can stop working after the first period if
desired.
Another one is multitasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), as the two actions
are different (as effort is cumulative) and both go in the direction of increasing the
principal’s utility. Even though the complementarity of both actions is a similarity with
the model presented in this article, the timing is quite different. As effort is cumulative
in my model, the first time the agent exerts effort impacts on the productivity of effort
in the extra chance; however, the effort exerted during this second chance does not
affect the productivity of the first one.
Zhao (2008) provides a model in which two contracting parties might be unaware
about their own or the counterpart’s strategy set. This was extended by articles like
Auster (2013) and von Thadden and Zhao (2014), although in these situations, usually
the agent is unaware of some of his options, and the principal decides to reveal — or not
— information about those to the agent through the contract. The model of this paper
considers a similar framework, however it departs from the main stream by considering
that: the principal might be unaware of the agent’s strategies, the principal makes a
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take-it-or-leave-it contract, and therefore the agent has no way to pass information to
the principal, and finally, I explore the possibility of the principal removing some of the
agent’s strategies by using deadlines.
Varas (2017) provides a model to explain why contracts exhibit low turnover rates
and deferred compensation. In his setup, managers can shorten the time they take to
carry out a project by sacrificing quality. The principal, therefore, delays compensation
to the future, so the quality of the project is revealed. This framework is related to
the one introduced in this paper in the sense that the agent can exert actions that can
create costs for the principal in the future. However, Varas’ setup is intended for longer
principal-agent relationships, in which termination is fundamental in the stationary
contracts. In this article, I focus on a short-term relationship between a principal and
an agent. This can be applied to suppliers, contractors, etc.
There is another branch of the literature that studies fraud using counterfeit signals,
but with a very important difference: the literature considers the problem as pure
adverse selection or instead as moral hazard followed by adverse selection, in which the
agent can choose the signal to present to the principal about a previous realization which
in turn can depend on some effort measure. In this literature, we find for example Maggi
and Rodŕıguez-Clare (1995) which propose a model in which the agent must reveal to
the principal its true type. Crocker and Morgan (1998), and Crocker and Slemrod
(2007) incorporate a first stage in which the agent must indeed exert an effort level,
and later he can decide to reveal or not the outcome (that is, reveal the true outcome
or a false one).
Clausen (2013) introduces a novel concept that extends the previous models in-
corporating the fact that the agent can decide to obscure the true outcome from the
principal, but he cannot control what it is going to be the signal that indeed the princi-
pal observes. Clausen considers a model in which the agent exerts effort once, and later
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there are successive accurate signals about the outcome realizations that are privately
observed by the agent each time before the principal. The agent can then decide to
counterfeit each signal for a better one deceiving the principal. The type of situations
that can be represented by this model are different from the ones I try to describe. In-
deed, Clausen mentions internet advertising click fraud, in which companies exaggerate
the reported clicks for internet advertising, or security companies that hide breaches,
to obscure the fact of having failed in their mission. A crucial difference with respect
to the model I present in this work is that the agent, instead of sending a counterfeit
signal to the principal, can exert effort and de facto improve the outcome. He cannot
deceive the principal by obscuring the outcome.
Finally, the gambling for resurrection literature (Calveras, Ganuza, and Hauk, 2004,
Thaler and Johnson, 1990) might also seem to be close to this work. Nevertheless, there
is a key difference. While the model presented in this paper focuses on the effects of
having the possibility of improving a poor outcome after the first effort was exerted, the
gambling for resurrection focuses on the risk attitudes of agents given a previous event.
The classical example is what Thaler and Johnson (1990) call the break-even effect, as
when agents with previous losses will take risky opportunities to recover even if those
carry even more risk. I am more interested in how the possibility of additional effort
can change the agent’s behavior from the beginning and how this affects the incentive
scheme design.
2.3 The Model
The classical moral hazard models in the literature considers a principal that makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract to an agent. This contract establishes a payment
schedule, from the principal to the agent, conditional on publicly observed outcomes.
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The outcomes are stochastic, but their distribution is influenced by the amount of
effort the agent has exerted. This effort is not observable, and that is precisely what
creates the moral hazard problem. I extend this classical model by giving the agent the
opportunity to improve a bad outcome after he has already exerted some effort, but
before it is observed by the principal.
Principal and agent are both assumed to be risk neutral. I assume further that
the agent is cash constrained. First principal and agent sign the contract, establishing
payments w ∈ {wl, wh} contingent on the observed output y ∈ {yl, yh}. The effort the
agent can exert is denoted by e ∈ {0, 1}, which impacts the probability of obtaining a
high output yh. This probability depends on the amount of effort exerted in the present
period and the past. Let (e1, e2) be the agent’s strategy that works in the following way:
the agent in the first period will exert e1 and later will observe an interim accurate signal
ŷ ∈ {yl, yh}. If ŷ = yh, the agent will not exert more effort whatsoever (as the outcome
cannot be improved) and the publicly observed outcome is y = ŷ = yh. However, if
ŷ = yl then what happens next depends on the agent’s choice of e2. If e2 = 0, there
is no second lottery and the previous outcome is maintained. The principal observes
y = yl and pays wl.
3 If e2 = 1 the outcome y is drawn from a lottery that assigns a
higher probability of occurrence to yh than in the previous period, because the total
amount of exerted effort has increased, and then capturing this model’s feature that
effort is considered cumulative. A contract under this setup is a wage schedule that
induces the agent to choose a particular effort strategy. Without any loss of generality
and for the sake of simplicity I will assume from now on that yl = 0.
The utility function of the principal is up = yi−wi, i = h, l, while the utility function
of the agent is ua = wi − e1 − βe2, i = h, l, where β > 0 represents the cost of exerting
3I assume a second lottery only if effort is exerted in the second period, while for the first one, no
effort still has a positive probability of success. This assumption brings tremendous gains in simplicity
and parsimony to the model. I have verified that giving the agent a free draw when e2 = 0 does not
change the main conclusions of the model.
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effort to improve upon the already realized outcome. Let the agent’s reservation utility
be u = 0. Furthermore, w0 ≥ 0, as the agent was assumed to be cash constrained.
Effort influences the probability of having a good outcome. This probability may
take the values p0, p1, and p2 defined as:
• p0 > 0 is the probability of success when no effort was exerted in the past, nor
the present.
• p1 > p0 is the probability of success when effort was exerted only once.
• p2 = 1 is the probability of success when effort is exerted now and in the past.
Note that the subscripts indicate how many times the agent has exerted effort at
that time. It is also worth noting that the probability of having a good outcome after
the first period can only be p0 or p1, while in the second lottery it can be p1 or p2.
Letting p2 = 1 allows focusing on the significance of p0 and p1. Finally, p0 is the
probability of success without exerting any effort, and as that it helps to measure how
much the effort can add to the outcome.
The complexity of the task is captured by p1. If p1 is high, for a given p0, then
exerting effort once is enough to have the goal achieved, and therefore it represents a
simple task, but if p1 is very low, then exerting effort once is most likely not to be
enough to achieve the desired goal, representing a complex task.
The model gives the agent the alternative to delay effort if convenient. If the agent
observes a bad interim outcome, exerting effort to fix that outcome implies the same
probability of success as having exerted effort at the beginning (p1). Moreover, when
choosing the strategy, the probability of success of (0, 1) is strictly higher when com-
pared to (1, 0). Note that the agent would delay effort, not because of impatience
(which is not modeled), but because of the value of the option of exerting the effort in
the future. In this model, delaying effort increases the chances of success compared to



























Figure 2.1: Agent’s decision tree.
exerting effort only in the first period. Of course this option is valuable as long as its
cost (β) is not too high. An illustration of the decisions the agent can make and their
impact on the outcome can be observed in Figure 2.1.
In the following subsections, I find the contracts under full information, with an
unaware principal with moral hazard, and with an aware principal also in the pres-
ence of moral hazard. Later I present a discussion on the inefficiencies created by the
information asymmetry.
Full Information
Without any information asymmetry, the maximization problem is equivalent to the
one the agent would solve if owning the project. Note that removing all information
asymmetry implies the principal is aware of the existence of both chances the agent
can use to exert effort. As such, she considers the direct trade-off between the expected
outcome and the cost of each strategy, allowing us to disregard the wage schedule.
Following this setup has many advantages. Firstly it allows identifying the welfare
maximizing strategies for the parameters of the problem. Secondly, it allows to set up
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very explicitly the best response for the agent in the problem with moral hazard. The
maximization problem under full information is:
max
(e1,e2)
pe1yh − e1 + e2(1− pe1)(pe1+1yh − β) (2.1)
Lemma 4. There exist β
1
< β1 such that with full information:
1. ∀ β > β
1
, (0, 1) is never contracted.
2. ∀ β < β1, (1, 0) is never contracted.
Proof. In Appendix B.1, I find the strategies that are implemented for different levels
of yh, given β. It can be established that β1 = p1/[(1 − p0) − p1(1 − p1)] and β1 =
1/(p1 − p0) are such that the lemma is satisfied. Note that β1 can be higher than 1, if
p1 > (3−
√
5)/2 and p0 > (1− p1)2.
Lemma 4 shows that, if the cost of exerting effort in the extra chance is too high,
it is never optimal to use it. In the same direction, if the cost of this extra chance
is low, and if it is worth to exert some effort, this chance is to be used. Moreover, if
this extra chance is very cheap, effort is going to be implemented in the form of (0, 1)
even for very low values of yh. Another interesting implication of Lemma 4 is that as
p1 − p0 → 0, or in words, either the task is so hard that needs effort twice, or the task
is easy enough that effort (once or twice) adds little, β
1
→ p1/(1− p1)2 while β1 →∞,
so while (0, 1) is still going to be implemented, (1, 0) is going to be implemented only
for an infinitely large cost of creating the second chance.
Lemma 4 considerably facilitates the computation of the contract with full informa-
tion, as it reduces the strategies to consider within intervals of β. The solution to the
problem stated in (2.1) is represented in Proposition 4.
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Proposition 4. The contract under perfect information is given by:
1. For β < β
1
,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ βp1 .
(b) (0, 1) for β
p1
≤ yh ≤ 1−β(p1−p0)(1−p0)(1−p1) .
(c) (1, 1) otherwise.
2. For β
1
< β < β1,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ 1+(1−p1)β1−p0 .
(b) (1, 1) otherwise.
3. For β1 < β.
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ 1p1−p0 .
(b) (1, 0) for 1
p1−p0 ≤ yh ≤ β.
(c) (1, 1) otherwise.
The contract under full information is represented in Figure 2.2. Note that it results
from the possibility of delaying effort that at least some effort is contracted even for
very low levels of yh. This is not only true because close to the origin the future effort
is cheap, as the fact that even for values of β greater than 1 this is still the case, but
because of the value of the option of delaying effort.
At higher levels of yh we observe that for low levels of β the strategy involving
exploiting the option of exerting future effort is preferred, and as β increases then (1, 1)
becomes optimal. This is because even though for those levels of β exerting the option
is still profitable, as β is now higher, the agent tries to diminish the probability of
having to use that option, and he achieves that by exerting effort in the first period. If
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yh is high enough, by increasing β, we only disregard the use of the option (as it will
never give positive expected profits), while if yh is lower, then from (1, 1) by increasing
β, the optimal strategy will be to exert no effort at all. This is another very graphical
way to observe the value of the option of delaying effort, as for a fixed yh the strategy








Figure 2.2: Contract under perfect information.
Finally, we can observe that while e2 does not increase in the cost of the second
effort (β), we also observe that, for some levels of yh, e1 is not monotonic in β. It
is surprising that e1 is exerted optimally at all for levels below yh = 1/(p1 − p0). To
pin down the cause of this, recall the previous discussion: setting e1 = 1 affects e2
in two ways. First, it makes it less likely that the second chance is going to be used,
and second, it increases the expected revenue for doing so, by increasing the chance
of success of e2 = 1 from p1 < 1 to p2 = 1. When increasing β, and yh is such that
the strategy moves from (1, 1) to (0, 0), the increasing cost of the second chance has
destroyed the benefits of this complementarity, leading to the optimality of no effort at
all.
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Moral Hazard and Unaware Principal
In this subsection, I portray the situation in which the principal does not know about
the possibility of the extra chance.
This unaware principal will propose the classical textbook moral hazard contract,
with wh = 1/(p1 − p0) for a good observed outcome, and wl = 0 otherwise.
We can use the optimal strategies under full information to describe the best re-
sponse of the agent, by considering wh = 1/(p1− p0). The principal will offer this wage
level if and only if yh ≥ p1/(p1 − p0)2. Replacing wh in the agent’s best response, we
obtain the strategies followed by the agent. These depend on the value of β. Note that
while (1, 0) and (0, 0) are the strategies the principal expects, (0, 1) and (1, 1) strategies
the principal does not expect, as she is unaware of them.
It can be shown (Appendix B.1) that, for wh = 1/(p1 − p0), the agent will never
choose (0, 0). Moreover, it can be shown that there exists thresholds on β such that the
agent will choose (0, 1), (1, 1) or (1, 0) within different intervals for β. Each of these
strategies will lead to different levels of outcome for the principal:
Strategy Exp. outcome for the principal Exp. outcome by unaware principal




















Table 2.1: Principal’s expected outcome.
In Table 2.1, we observe that for each of these scenarios, the principal is at least as
good as she expect to be in the traditional model without the extra chance. However,
that is not all. The agent also benefits from this, as he obtains larger rents which are
created by the extra chance. More specifically, the principal could have induced the
same strategies with a much lower wage, keeping a higher share of the outcome.
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Table 2.2: Rents distribution with unaware principal. ∗ when β < β1, and ∗∗ when
β ≥ β1.
It can be shown that the agent’s gains are always positive, given his optimal chosen
strategy for the parameters involved (probabilities of success and future cost of effort,
β).
Moral Hazard
Under moral hazard, I consider the traditional participation constraint and the incentive
compatibility constraint ensuring that the agent accepts to sign the contract and chooses
the desired strategy. The cost for the principal is represented by the wages wh and wl
for the good and bad outcome respectively. Recall that the agent is assumed to be cash
constrained, and therefore I set immediately wl = 0. The principal’s maximization
problem when facing asymmetric information is represented by:
max
wh,e1,e2
pe1(yh − wh) + e2(1− pe1)pe1+1(yh − wh) (2.2)
s.t. pe1wh − e1 + e2(1− pe1)(pe1+1wh − β) ≥ 0
(e1, e2) ∈ arg max
(ê1,ê2)
pê1wh − ê1 + ê2(1− pê1)(pê1+1wh − β)
The incentive compatibility is given by the solution to the problem with full infor-
mation. The only difference is that it is necessary to replace yh with wh, as the agent is
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now getting only wh instead of the whole outcome. This gives immediately the optimal
incentive compatible wages for a given β and outcome distribution. As such β
1
and
β1 from Lemma 4 are also critical points for the case with moral hazard, as for the
principal, it is impossible to implement a contract involving (1, 0) or (0, 1) between
those parameters, no matter the wage. Having the incentive compatible wage for each
strategy, and having the implementable contracts as a function of β, it is just a matter
of comparing expected profits of implementing each strategy, leading to the first result
in the presence of moral hazard, expressed in Lemma 5.




) and β2 (> β1) such that under asymmetric informa-
tion:
1. ∀ β > β
2
, (0, 1) is never implemented.
2. ∀ β < β2, (1, 0) is never implemented.
Proof. Comparing the expected profits of implementing each strategy, given the wages






p0 + p1 − (1− p1)[p21 + p20 − p20p1]− p0p1(3− p1)
,
while there exists yh such that (1, 0) is optimal only if








since p1p0(1 − p0)(1 − p1)2 > 0 and
β1 < β2 since 0 < p0 < p1 < 1.
An important implication of Lemma 5 is that the contracts implementing (0, 1)
and (1, 0) have more restrictive requirements over β than when compared to the case
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with perfect information. An important remark is that, even though the β2s found in
Lemma 5 play the same role that the β1s played in the case without moral hazard, the
β1 are still very important for the case with asymmetric information. They now affect
directly the incentive compatibility constraint, as they define the regions for which the
agent will never play (1, 0) or (0, 1), no matter wh. The contract under moral hazard
is described for five different intervals for β as stated in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Under asymmetric information, the contract with a cash constrained
agent is given by:
1. For β < β
2
,



















(c) (1, 1) otherwise.
2. For β
2
< β < β
1
,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ 1−β(p1−p0)(1−p0)2(1−p1) .
(b) (1, 1) otherwise.
3. For β
1
< β < β1,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ 1+(1−p1)β(1−p0)2 .
(b) (1, 1) otherwise.
4. For β1 < β < β2,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ β1−p0 .
(b) (1, 1) otherwise.
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5. For β2 < β.
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ p1(p1−p0)2 .
(b) (1, 0) for p1
(p1−p0)2 ≤ yh ≤
β(p1−p0)−p1
(1−p1)(p1−p0) .
(c) (1, 1) otherwise.
Focusing the attention on the first interval for β, we observe how (0, 1) becomes
optimal for a broader set of parameter values than compared to the case with full
information. Note that the denominator in the interval is quite small, leading to a very
big intercept on the frontier between (0, 1) and (1, 1) as optimal contracts. Looking at
Figure 2.3 there is a very interesting fringe of yh about the middle. There are some
values of yh for which, by increasing β, we have the following transition: starts with
(0, 1), then moves to (0, 0), followed by (1, 1) to finally come back to (0, 0).
Proposition 6. With information asymmetries there exist yh such that e2 is not mono-
tonically decreasing in β.
Proof. The proof follows directly Proposition 5 and Lemma 5. Let





















the optimal contract will change from (0, 0) to (1, 1), as the slope
of the frontier between both is decreasing in β. It can be observed as well, that for β
increasing above β
1
the optimal contract will move from (1, 1) to a contract for which
e2 is zero, as the frontier between both has always a positive slope.








Figure 2.3: Contract with moral hazard.
The set of (0, 0) is not convex, which follows directly from Proposition 5 where the
slope of the frontier of (0, 0) changes from positive to negative and later to positive
again. At very low levels of β, (0, 1) is implemented following the same logic it had in
the case with full information. The second chance, being so cheap, makes it preferable
to bet all in taking the risk and later try to fix any bad outcome. As β gets closer
to β
2
(for the same level of yh) the extra chance becomes more costly, so it would
be better to avoid it. The logic behind the solution with full information to achieve
that was to implement (1, 1) instead, in order to decrease the probability of using the
extra chance. However, as β is still low, the agent would prefer to deviate to gamble
with (0, 1), and therefore the incentives to make him stick to (1, 1) become too high.
In this situation, the principal decides to implement (0, 0). As β increases further,
approaching now β
1
, the principal knows that the incentives for the agent to deviate
from (1, 1) decrease, diminishing the agency costs, so she will start implementing (1, 1)
again. The lower yh inside the fringe, the closer the β needs to be to β1. In fact in the
limit, it will coincide and will implement (1, 1) just in β = β
1
. When β is above β
1
, the
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logic of the model follows the case with full information. (1, 1) is implemented instead
(0, 1) as β becomes larger, to decrease the possibility of paying the cost of the extra
chance, and as β increases even further, the principal will implement strategies with
e2 = 0, and setting e1 = 1 or e1 = 0 depending on the level of yh. While, as expected,
introducing agency costs in the model changes the optimal solution for the principal,
the information rents around β
1
create the non-convexity in the model. Note that to
the left of β
1
the agent has the option to deviate between three contracts, while to the
right of β
1
he endogenously will never choose (0, 1), so the principal does not require
to provide incentives to prevent that deviation.
As it was the case under full information, we observe that e1 is not monotonic on
β for some values of yh either. This follows the same rationale previously discussed in
the sense that, increasing β, the benefits of the complementarity between e1 and e2 are
offset by the higher cost, requiring higher values of yh to justify this strategy.
The other comparisons that can be made between the cases with full or imperfect
information are in line with what would be expected in the traditional models of moral
hazard and are illustrated in Figure 2.4. First, we observe that (0, 0) expands against
all the other contracts. Besides the change in convexity of the set of (0, 0) discussed
previously for the contract with imperfect information, the change in the extension of
the sets implementing (0, 1) and (1, 0) is clear. In particular, the change in the slope
of the frontier between (0, 1) and (1, 1) makes it very hard (require very high values of
yh) to implement (1, 1) when β falls below β2. It is remarkable that β2 is not required
to be below 1 for this to happen, so this case happens even when the creation of this
extra chance is relatively more costly than exerting effort on the first chance.
The conclusions of Lemma 5 can also be observed in Figure 2.4. Note how larger
the interval of [β, β], for which only (0, 0) or (1, 1) contracts are implemented, is in
when compared to the case with full information. This happens because without full
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information, it is easier for the agent to deviate from one of those contracts to the other,
or from (1, 1) to (1, 0), and therefore the principal will prefer to implement contracts
that give him better information about what was done by the agent. When β is very
high (above β2), the principal can incentivate the agent to not deviate from his strategy,
starting to implement (1, 0) again. Basically to the left of β
2
the principal is resigned









Figure 2.4: Contracts with full (dashed) and imperfect (solid) information.
A final conclusion that can be made from the comparison between the contracts with
and without moral hazard is that the space in which e2 is used decreases considerably
because of the expansion of (0, 1) to regions for which (1, 1) was optimal. Also by the
change in the slope of the frontier between (1, 0) and (1, 1) from the case with full to
imperfect information, it is clear that not only (0, 0) is to be implemented for a broader
set of parameters, but (1, 0) as well, although for higher values of yh and β.
The study of the scenario with moral hazard shows that, when the agent has a
low cost for creating the extra instance, it is very costly for the principal to dissuade




In this section, I assume that the principal cares about how the outcome was achieved.
Some of the analogies previously made with the strategies that the agent can follow
imply risky financial activities or dubious process manipulation. Even further, creating
the extra chance can be sometimes illegal (forcing workers to work extra hours when it
is not allowed), or incurring in practices that might be censored by a regulator or the
industry.
These costs might be the expected punishment the principal faces if caught by
the regulator. Consider the recent case in the automobile industry, in which many
brands modified the computers in their motors to pass the emission regulation tests. If
the people in charge knew that software like this could be produced, that has a high
probability of succeeding to passing the test, at a very cheap cost (in the model this
would be very high p1 with a very low β) they have strong incentives to take their
chances with the software. If the expected cost of the transgression is low, then the
principal might contract strategies in which gambling is encouraged, obtaining higher
profits: if β is low, the required compensation is also low, and therefore the principal
obtains a bigger surplus.
In what follows, I will assume that exerting e2, if detected by the regulator, triggers
a punishment to the principal, such that its expected cost, if e2 was exerted, is ξ. The
immediate effect we can depict is that the strategies involving the second effort will see
their expected return decreased, and therefore the strategies without e2 will be optimal
for a wider set of parameters.
The introduction of an externality cost, under perfect information, that is if the
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principal could indeed choose the optimal level of effort to maximize aggregated surplus,
has a similar effect than facing a massive cost of e2, or β. The detailed derivation of
this version of the model is left for Appendix B.2.1. Figure 2.5 contains the main
implications of introducing an externality in the case without moral hazard.
To start with, the strategy involving shirking and exerting effort when facing a
bad outcome becomes less optimal than when there is no externality. Exerting effort
in both periods becomes preferred over (0, 1), but it is nevertheless implemented less
than in the original model, losing against (0, 0) and (1, 0). As the shape of the plot
remains more or less equal, we obtain the first result of introducing the externality.
The variables β and β are shifted to the left along with the plot, exactly in the value
of ξ. This implies that the strategy (0, 1) might end up being completely wiped off in
the absence of moral hazard for some value of ξ high enough, this threshold is stated
in the following proposition:
Proposition 7. With full information, if the cost ξ exceeds p1/[(1 − p0) − p1(1 − p1)]
then (0, 1) is never optimal.
Proof. In Appendix B.2.1 can be observed that (0, 1) is implemented only for values of β
between 0 and p1/[(1−p0)−p1(1−p1)]−ξ. As β ≥ 0 then for ξ > p1/[(1−p0)−p1(1−p1)]
the set for which (0, 1) results optimal is empty.
Now when considering moral hazard, I assume as usual that the principal cannot
observe the agent’s actions. Again, the introduction of the externality should carry
similar consequences of those that higher values of β would carry.
The detailed solution of this problem can be found in Appendix B.2.2. As expected,
now the strategies (0, 1) and (1, 1) have higher potential cost for the principal, and
therefore they turn out to be optimal in a smaller parameter space when compared to








Figure 2.5: Contract with full information and externality.
identical to the one that happens in the version with perfect information though. Now,
because of the agency problem, the plot does not move to the left as it happened before.
Note that the values of β
1
and β1 are not affected at all.
A similarity, though, with the full information case is that there is a value for ξ that
makes (0, 1) never optimal.
Proposition 8. If the cost ξ is higher or equal than
p1
(1− p0)(1− p1)[(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)]
then (0, 1) is never optimal.
Proof. In Appendix B.2.2 it can be observed that (0, 1) is implemented only for values




p21 + [p1(1− p0)(1− p1){(1− p1)p1 − (1− p0)}]ξ
[p0 + (1− p0)p1](1− p0)(1− p1) + (p1 − p0)p21
]
As β ≥ 0 then for ξ ≥ p1/{(1 − p0)(1 − p1)[(1 − p0) − p1(1 − p1)]} the set for which
54 CHAPTER 2. HUNTING WITH TWO BULLETS







Figure 2.6: Contract under moral hazard and externality.
The strategy (1, 1) can never be ruled out for a finite externality cost, because even
if ξ > 1/(p1 − p0), which would make β1 negative, there can always be found a yh
big enough such that it will be optimal to exert effort in both opportunities. As a
consequence, if the regulator would like to prevent second effort in any scenario, it
would need, as expected, to relate the punishment (ξ) to yh, such that the principal
avoids implementing strategies with (−, 1) at all. Furthermore, this would make the
principal to implement shorter deadlines more often.
The agency costs are aggravated, which is reflected in Figure 2.6. In the region
where the non-convexity of (0, 0) occurs, with the externality these costs are higher. As
the principal is bearing the costs ξ and not the agent, the principal contracts strategies





I propose a model of moral hazard in which the agent has more than one chance to exert
effort before revealing the output to the principal. The agent, after exerting some effort,
observes an interim signal and then decides whether to make more effort to improve an
adverse outcome or to deliver the outcome immediately.
Both agent and principal value this extra chance. I show how this situation creates
extra rents that are split between principal and agent, when the principal offers the
classical contract without the second chance, to an agent that can actually create this
extra chance. Moreover, I find that when the principal knows about the extra chance,
and there is no information asymmetry, both agent and principal value the possibility of
fixing a bad outcome as an option, by being able to shirk at the beginning, if convenient,
and later trying to fix a potentially adverse outcome.
However, once the information asymmetries are introduced, implementing a never
shirking contract, and when the cost of creating the additional instance is low, happens
for very high values of positive outcomes only. One of the main findings of the model
is that with moral hazard the effort in the extra chance is not necessarily decreasing on
its cost, existing values of output for which an increase in the cost of the second chance
might increase the effort contracted in that second chance.
Finally, I study what happens if the extra chance can bring later consequences,
and therefore costs, to the principal. This is done in order to adapt the model to
situations in which this extra chance represents the use of illegal techniques to deliver
the outcome as promised. I find that this possible cost for the principal causes that
the strategies that do not involve the use of this extra chance become optimal for a
wider set of parameters. Moreover, the principal will write contracts that incentive
effort in the first period where with full information would have contracted effort only
in the second chance, with the hopes of decreasing the probability of the agent using
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the second chance.
Chapter 3
Bidding in First Price Sealed Bid
Common Value Auctions:
A Computational Approach1
This chapter is a joint work with Ingemar Dierickx.
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we address the problem that bidders face in first price sealed bid (FPSB)
auctions for common value goods: How much to shade their signals about the value of
the object being sold. Countless firms are grappling with this problem every day. Yet,
the auction literature offers little practical advice on how to determine an optimal bid.
Two different disciplines, economics and decision sciences, have taken totally different
approaches to the auction problem. Excellent reviews of the different approaches to
auctions can be found in Rothkopf (2007) and Lorentziadis (2016).
1This chapter profited specially from the comments of Steffen Hoernig. We also appreciate valuable
comments from Guido Maretto, Susana Peralta, Fernando Anjos, Pedro Vicente, Patrick Rey, Robert
Wilson, and the participants at the Nova SBE RG Seminar.
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The economics literature models auction outcomes as Bayes Nash equilibria. While
it offers valuable advice for auctioneers on auction design, it provides little practical
guidance to bidders. Some papers, most notably Wilson (1967, 1969, 1977, 1998),
Milgrom and Weber (1982a), and more recently Hoernig and Fagandini (2018) actually
try to pin down a bidding function for the bidders, but elegant analytical solutions are
derived at the cost of a good amount of simplifying assumptions that are rarely satisfied
in real life.
Another limitation of this literature is that theoretical results are usually derived
in models with uniformly additive noise, an assumption that is required to solve those
models analytically.2 In the applied literature, normal and log-normal distributions are
usually thought to be best suited to model real life problems. For example, electricity
markets are usually modeled with additive normal noise, while hydrocarbon reservoirs
in the petroleum industry are treated with a log-normal distribution.3
Although some of the economic theory work includes asymmetries on the parameters
of the distributions of the signal noise — e.g. Wilson (1998) — most of the literature
assumes symmetry at least in one dimension (for example, rationality of all the bidders).
This is an important limitation. While symmetry assumptions are often necessary to
ensure tractability of the models, they are, as Armantier and Sbai (2006) have pointed
out, not often found in the real world. Furthermore, as we show in this paper, even small
deviations from the classic symmetry assumptions result in sharply different optimal
bids.
Recently the economic theory literature has tried to deal with more degrees of
asymmetries among the population of bidders. In particular, Eyster and Rabin (2005),
with their concept of Cursed Equilibrium, provide a new explanation for the Winner’s
2Klemperer (2004), Krishna (2010), Milgrom (2004), Salant (2014).
3Crawford (1970), Smiley (1979).
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Curse.4 In their model, some agents fail to take into account how information impacts
the other players’ strategies. The cursedness hypothesis indeed helps to improve the
fitting of laboratory data to the models, however it (and the data) also suffers from
simplifying assumptions common to the rest of the theoretical literature: in general
uniform distributions (and bounded domains), symmetry assumptions; and is hard to
put into practice.
Crawford and Iriberri (2007) also study out-of-equilibrium models to explain bid-
ders’ behavior that is inconsistent with the traditional Bayes Nash solution. In par-
ticular, they apply the concept of Level-K Thinking introduced by Stahl and Wilson
(1994, 1995). That means that bidders are assumed to reach a certain level of best
responding. Say, if there are two bidders, both bidders assume a particular strategy
by the other bidder. They best respond to that strategy. Later, they realize that the
other player could have done the same reasoning, and so decide to best respond to
their previous strategy. They can go in this reasoning forever, reaching a Nash Equi-
librium. How many times they follow the reasoning of best responding to the previous
strategy is the value of “k.” The more times they are allowed to do that, the closer is
the equilibrium to a Nash Equilibrium (which would require “∞-level”). They man-
age to explain data of overbidding in first price common value auctions — as well as
in independent-private-value auctions — when compared to the Bayesian Equilibrium.
There is no doubt about their contribution to explaining laboratory data; however, it
does not look to offer practical advice on how a bidder should prepare a bid, suffering
again from the classic simplifying assumptions of the economic theory literature we
mentioned previously.
We believe that our model, with its simplifying assumptions, makes it more tangible
for the practitioner while respecting other authors’ appreciations. For example Dyer,
4We consider slightly above a decade as fairly recent in the auction literature.
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Kagel, and Levin (1989) consider that some experienced bidders might follow simple
strategies when facing an auction: “We believe that in the field the executives have
learned a set of situation specific rules of thumb...” which would work only in invariant
environments.
Decision theory has focused more on the bidders’ problem. Since it is not, in general,
feasible to analytically derive the Bayes Nash equilibrium bidding strategies in realistic
scenarios, bidding strategies are optimized against a given distribution of competitors’
bids relying mostly on Monte Carlo simulations.5 There are some early decision theo-
retic and experimental contributions from the 50’s and the 60’s,6 there are papers that
address the bidders’ problem within the context of a specific industry,7 and there is a
body of papers that propose computational methods to determine optimal bids, this
time not in the sense of the Bayes Nash equilibrium.8 One computational approach
uses data from previous auctions and runs Monte Carlo simulations to determine op-
timal bids. Key papers include David (1993), Wen and David (2001), Ma, Wen, Ni,
and Liu (2005), among others. In a second computational approach, data from earlier
auctions are used to estimate the moments of the distribution from which bidders’ sig-
nals are drawn, assuming that Bayes Nash equilibrium strategies were played by the
other bidders, and optimal bids are then computed using classical symmetric models.
Key papers include Bajari (1998), Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005), Campo, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2003), among others.
In this paper, we build upon the pioneering work of Rothkopf (1969) and Wilson
(1984), who use non-Bayes Nash equilibrium models, and propose a practical computa-
tional method that enables firms to submit bids that maximize ex-ante expected profits
5R. Wilson and M. Rothkopf are probably among the most prolific authors that actually looked at
both sides, economic theory and decision sciences.
6For example Friedman (1956), Ortega Reichert (1968), among others.
7E.g. Capen, Clapp, Campbell, et al. (1971).
8From now on we will refer to equilibrium or optimal shading factor as the solution from the ex-ante
signal point of view. When we refer to a Bayesian equilibrium, we will do so explicitly.
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in a broad range of realistic valuation and information scenarios.
Specifically, we find a constant shading factor (SF ) that is computed ex-ante of
receiving the signal and:9 (i) allows for a common value component as well as a firm-
specific component in valuations, (ii) allows for differences in the accuracy of bidder
signals, and (iii) allows for the introduction of non-rational bidders. Rothkopf (1980),
and Compte and Postlewaite (2012) provide discussions on why constant strategies, and
shading before observing the signal, should approximate Bayesian equilibrium strategies
when the prior is diffuse.
To test whether the SF results in Bayes Nash equilibrium bids, we use as benchmark
the solution to the symmetric problem found in Hoernig and Fagandini (2018),10 and
find that the SF exactly replicates those results when the prior is diffuse. In addition,
we checked the programming code and the derived first order conditions with results
from brute force Monte Carlo simulations in a broader range of scenarios.
We also generalize Robert Wilson’s bias factor (BF ) to obtain a measure of the
Winner’s Curse. In short, the BF shades the bidder’s signal by the expected error of
the signal conditional on winning. Therefore, this correction allows the bidder to obtain
zero expected winning profits avoiding the Winner’s Curse. If the BF allows the bidder
to obtain zero expected winning profits, it is natural that an optimal constant shading
should be larger. An optimal constant shading should take into account two effects,
the Winner’s Curse and the competitive effect. The more bidders are playing, the more
aggressive a bidder must be in order to win the auction, however, the more bidders the
more severe the Winner’s Curse, and therefore the bidders should be more conservative.
To disentangle these two opposite effects we consider the BF as the portion of the
9These types of strategies are to be expected in real life. For example Shachat and Wei (2012) find
that while Bayesian equilibrium fits better English auctions data, constant shading strategies are more
often found in first price sealed bid auctions.
10Wilson (1969) was the first one to find an explicit bidding function, however it was limited to only
two symmetric bidders.
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SF that takes care of avoiding the Winner’s Curse, while the other accounts for the
competitive effect.
Finally, we allow for a subset of “naive” bidders. These naive bidders follow a simple
rule of thumb, and shade their signals by an arbitrary fixed amount. While the model
allows to set any fixed shading for these naive bidders we assume they only neglect
the Winner’s Curse: they shade their bids by shading factor minus the bias factor.
By doing so, we let these players to properly account for the competitive effect, but
not to account for the Winner’s Curse,11 and analyze their impact on the optimal bids
of sophisticated bidders. The presence of naive bidders in real life bidding problems
cannot be denied. Occurrence of the Winner’s Curse in common value auctions has been
acknowledged since more than a half a century (Kagel and Levin, 2002). Dyer et al.
(1989) document that in laboratory experiments even experienced executives in the
construction industry, who are successful in their jobs, suffer from the Winner’s Curse.
They suggest that industry specific learning and situation-specific rules of thumb, which
could not be applied in a laboratory setting, may help them avoid overbidding in the
field. Furthermore, experienced contractors do suffer unanticipated losses when bidding
on a type of project they are not familiar with.12 Without going further, the study that
brought the Winner’s Curse into light by Capen et al. (1971) is based on field data. All
these findings suggest that in real life auctions it is not unlikely that a subset of bidders
may be “naive”. We find that failing to account for the presence of naive bidders results
in underbidding when there is one naive competitor and severe overbidding when the
population of naive competitors is large.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2 we present the model and introduce
the shading factor. In Section 3.3, we present the bias factor. In Section 3.4 we show
11The term “naive” is used in the same sense by Kagel and Levin (2002), and in a similar way in
Lorentziadis (2012).
12Thaler (1988) provides a very good revision of laboratory and field studies that put in evidence
the existence of the Winner’s Curse.
3.2. THE MODEL 63
how shading factors react to specific asymmetries in the bidding population. Section
3.5 summarizes key conclusions and implications of our work and suggests avenues for
future research.
3.2 The Model
Assume that there are n bidders, competing in a first price sealed bid (FPSB) auction
for an item with unknown value µi = ∆i + µ, where µ is the unknown common value
part for everyone, and ∆i represents a constant private value component. All bidders
receive an unbiased signal of their valuation for the auctioned object si = µi + εi, with
εi independently distributed N(0, σ
2
i ). This setup allow us to consider three sources
of heterogeneity in the bidder population: bidder-specific valuation differences (∆i),
differences in the accuracy of bidders’ signals (σ2i ), and the presence of naive as well as
rational bidders. The heterogeneity that might exist among bidders and the number of
bidders is common knowledge.
Specifically, we allow for two groups of bidders,13 whose members receive a signal
drawn from the same family of distributions but with different moments.14 These
may stem from a variety of factors such as different economies of scale, experience,
technological factors, and so on. If ∆i = 0 for every bidder we have a pure common
value scenario.
Finally, we allow for the presence of “naive” bidders. These bidders will shade some
amount that does not maximize expected profits in any sense (nor ex-ante as we do, nor
ex-post as in the Bayes Nash equilibrium). In particular, we will set a shading assuming
13The analysis can be extended to three or more groups. However, 2 groups are sufficient to show
the main comparative statistics.
14Note, however that while the moments may differ the nature (Normal or Log Normal) of the
underlying distribution is the same for all bidders. This is consistent with the auction literature and
reflects the fact that the distribution of the error term is related to the characteristics of the auctioned
item and not to the characteristics of the bidders.
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these bidders fail to account for the Winner’s Curse.15 Rational bidders choose ex-ante
equilibrium bids against the population of - rational and/or naive - opponents they are
facing. What naive bidders do is assumed to be known by the rational ones.
Our model applies to two main cases: one with additive noise si = µ+ ∆i + εi with
εi ∼ N(0, σ2i ), the other with multiplicative noise si = µ∆iηi with ηi ∼ LN(0, σ2i ). We
focus on the additive model, as the multiplicative model can be transformed into the
additive model by taking the natural logarithm.
We use the fact that Monte Carlo simulations are often used in the bidding process,
by simulating competitors’ bids, but instead of actually assuming bids for other rational
players, we look for ex-ante equilibrium bids among all the rational bidders. Also,
instead of simulating many scenarios that could consume a huge amount of computing
power, deliver not very precise estimates and be very inefficient to optimize with, we
obtain the equilibrium constant shadings from the first order conditions. This helps to
obtain accurate estimates quickly.
Let ci be the shading applied by bidder i, for i = 1, 2, ..., n. That is, she submits
a bid bi = si − ci, and consequently, conditional on µ, her bids are distributed N(µ +
∆i − ci, σ2i ).
The ex-ante expected profits for bidder i are:





















Fj(∆i − ci − (∆j − cj) + εi)
]
(3.1)
15While the model allows for any constant shading for these naive bidders, we consider they shade
the SF minus the BF , which accounts only for the Winner’s Curse and is further explained in Section
3.3.
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where fk(·) and Fk(·) are the density and cumulative distribution functions of εk for
k = 1, ..., n respectively. It is clear how from the ex-ante perspective, the common
component µ cancels out, and therefore the ex-ante expected profits do not depend on
µ nor on its prior distribution. The decision variable of bidder i is ci, the amount she
will shade her bid.
The shading factor for bidder i then is the ci that maximizes (3.1). A Nash Equi-
librium in pure strategies in shading factors is defined as:
Definition 3. Let there be M bidders, from which N ≤M are rational bidders. Let ci
be the shading applied by each bidder. Fix the naive bidders’ shading at (cN+1, ..., cM).
The vector (c1, c2, ..., cN) is an equilibrium if, for a given (cN+1, ..., cM) and for all i
from 1 to N , it holds that:







Fj(∆i − ĉ− (∆j − cj) + εi)
]
(3.2)
The shadings applied by the rational bidders in equilibrium {ci}N1 are called the Shading
Factors.














where zij = ∆i − ci − (∆j − cj). In Figure 3.1 it can be seen that the second order
condition is satisfied as well. We generate that plot for each bidder, in every simulation,
to verify that we are in the presence of a local maximum. Computational methods are
used to solve this problem. The steps for the algorithm are as follows: (i) assume
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Figure 3.1: Expected profits, expected winning profits, and probability of winning
for different values of the shading factor. Simulation for a bidder facing a symmetric
competitor playing the equilibrium SF ≈ 1.77.
that the initial shading for all the rational bidders is zero, (ii) find the optimal shading
from the first order condition (3.3) for all the rational bidders, assuming all the other
rational bidders’ are shading according to the previously assumed shading, (iii) update
the optimal shading for every rational bidder, (iv) assess how much has the SF changed
compared to the previous value. If some bidder’s SF has changed more than 10−4, we
iterate from (ii), using the last shadings found for the rational bidders. For cases where
the standard deviation or the number of bidders is not too large, the algorithm converges
relatively fast (in the order of a couple of seconds).
In Figure 3.1 we plot the ex-ante expected profits for a bidder facing a symmetric
competitor, who is already applying the SF , as a function of her shading. We also plot
the probability of winning and the ex-ante expected winning profits. Quick inspection
of the results for larger numbers of bidders also shows that as the number of bidders
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increases, expected profits converge to zero — as they should.
We checked our results with Monte Carlo simulations in the following sense. We
generated signals for the bidders, applied a shading, and averaged profits. Doing that we
looked for the shading that gave bidders the highest expected profits, when considering
the others’ shadings. The estimates confirmed our results obtained by using the first
order condition in (3.3).
Finally, we verified that our model replicates the optimal shading found in Hoernig
and Fagandini (2018), who extended the original 2-bidders result from Wilson (1969)
to multiple bidders. They derive the Bayes Nash equilibrium bidding function for the
symmetric problem with n bidders and a diffuse prior. Their solution corresponds to:








where σ is the standard deviation of each bidder’s signal error. The fact that our model
coincides with the Bayes Nash equilibrium for the symmetric case makes us believe that
it should produce optimal bids for asymmetric auctions as well.
3.3 The Bias Factor
In any first price auction the bidder should bid below his valuation to have any profits.
In a common value auction this is particularly true, as the expected winner’s signal is
above the true valuation, giving birth to the Winner’s Curse.
More specifically, a bidder bidding in a first price sealed bid common value auction
should take into account two considerations: the Winner’s Curse and competition. Ac-
counting for the Winner’s Curse requires bidders to bid more cautiously as the number
of bidders increases. On the other hand, increased competition decreases the probability
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of winning, leading the bidders to bid more aggressively.
The bias factor (BF ) introduced by Wilson (1984) — and revisited by Cramton
(1995) — enables us to disentangle these two effects.
The BF indicates by how many standard deviations the signal received by the





For the symmetric case considered by Wilson, the BF corresponds to the expected
signal error conditional on winning divided by the standard deviation.16 Moreover,
independently of the strategy chosen by the bidders, as long it is symmetric and in-
creasing in the signal, the BF will tell exactly how the expected signal received by the
winner will over estimate the true value of the auctioned object. Applying the (addi-
tive) bias factor to the signal ensures that the adjusted signal ŝi is unbiased conditional
on winning:
ŝi = si −BFi × σi
E[ŝi|win] = µ+ ∆i
Shading signals by the bias factor, i.e. bi = ŝi, results in zero expected winning
profits. Thus the BF given c−i can be computed by solving
16Wilson divided by σ just to have a result that was scale-independent.






Fj(∆i − ci − (∆j − cj) + εi)
]
= 0 (3.6)
With heterogeneous bidders, the bias factor is no longer the highest order statistic
of the signal error. Naturally, it is different for every bidder.








Table 3.1: Bias factors as found by Wilson (1984) for symmetric bidders. εi ∼ N(0, 1).
We find that the classical results in the literature for the Winner’s Curse (Capen
et al., 1971, Kagel and Levin, 2002, Rothkopf, 1969, Wilson, 1967) hold. The Win-
ner’s Curse effect is stronger — and the bias factor is correspondingly larger — when
the number of rivals is greater (Table 3.1), when rivals have an intrinsic firm-specific
valuation advantage, and when the bidder signals are less accurate. We also find that
the bias factor increases sharply when some rivals are naive. Intuitively, it is clear that
winning against a naive bidder, who does not account for the Winner’s Curse, would
be “worse news” than winning against a rational bidder, and therefore that a larger
adjustment is required to avoid the Winner’s curse. However, the magnitude of this
effect — particularly when there are two or more naive rivals — is unexpected.
While the bias factor is by no means a tool to generate optimal bids, it is useful in
three very important ways. First, it provides a lower bound for an optimal shading.
Second, it enables us to isolate the Winner’s Curse effect, which helps to explain why
bids do not change monotonically in the number of bidders, a fact that might at first
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seem surprising. We do that by computing the BF for a bidder facing competitors
who use the correct SF . The SF , as we mentioned earlier, encompasses two effects,
the Winner’s Curse and competition. By isolating the Winner’s Curse with the BF ,
we can obtain the competitive effect, which describes the trade-off between the gains
in case of winning, and the probability of beating the other bidders. This is shown
later in Table 3.2. Third, the bias factor enables us to suggest a plausible candidate for
bids submitted by naive bidders; in turn this makes it possible to assess the impact of
naive bidders on the bids — and expected profits — of rational bidders. These issues
are taken up in Section 3.4 below. Although in our model — and in general — naive
bidders could take any shading behavior we decide — for example, a constant markup
of 20% of a standard deviation — we decided to give our naive bidders the benefit of
the doubt, and let them account at least for the competitive effect, only ignoring the
Winner’s Curse. If the competitive factor is the difference between the SF and the
BF , we let naive bidders shade their signals by CF = SF −BF .
3.4 Simulations and Predictions
In this section we first examine the shading factor in a few simple cases to verify whether
our methodology produces results that are in accord with the standard results in the
literature. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of valuation asymmetries (firm-specific
valuation differences), information asymmetries (some bidders receiving a noisier signal
than others), and the presence of naive bidders on equilibrium bidding strategies.
3.4.1 Rational Symmetric Bidders
In this subsection, we consider the symmetric all-rational model to verify consistency
with predictions in the literature. Examining the SF , winning profits and the prob-
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ability of winning for different numbers of bidders (N) and different levels of noise in
their signals, confirms that our model reproduces standard results for a population of
rational symmetric bidders.
For example, general results corroborate the intuition that the BF is a lower bound
to the SF , and that the SF converges to the BF as the number of bidders increases,
implying zero expected profits when bidders approach infinity, in accordance with the
literature.
Table 3.2 shows an interesting pattern in the SF for a symmetric all-rational auction
when signals are drawn from a standard normal distribution.
Bidders BF CF SF Exp. Winning Profits Prob. Win
2 0.17 1.60 1.77 1.21 0.50
3 0.43 1.08 1.51 0.66 0.33
4 0.62 0.89 1.51 0.48 0.25
5 0.76 0.79 1.55 0.38 0.20
6 0.87 0.73 1.60 0.33 0.17
7 0.96 0.68 1.64 0.29 0.14
8 1.04 0.65 1.66 0.26 0.13
Table 3.2: Correction for symmetric bidders with εi ∼ N(0, 1).
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Figure 3.2: Decomposition of the shading factor in the Winner’s Curse and the com-
petitive effect. Symmetric bidders with εi ∼ N(0, 1).
As the number of bidders increases, the probability of winning and expected winning
profits monotonically decline as they should. However, there appears to be an anomaly
in the SF : the amount by which bidders shade their bids first decreases when N
goes from 2 to 4, and then steadily increases from there on.17 As suggested earlier in
this paper, this non-monotonic pattern is the result of two effects working in opposite
directions. As a bidder faces more rivals, (i) the Winner’s Curse looms larger, which
requires a larger adjustment of her signal, and (ii) competition increases, which requires
her to bid closer to her signal, i.e. to sacrifice winning margin for a higher probability
of winning. Initially, the competition effect dominates. With 2 bidders, low rivalry
results in bidders shading their bids substantially; as the number of bidders gets larger,
increasing rivalry leads them to bid closer to their valuation. With more than 4 bidders,
however, the need to compensate for the Winner’s Curse becomes the dominant effect,
driving more conservative bids as the number of bidders increases.
Table 3.3 shows the impact of all bidders having less accurate signals, for a fixed
17This finding was confirmed also with Monte Carlo simulations to rule out potential coding issues.
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number of bidders. As expected, the adjustment implied by the shading factor increases.
It is interesting to note that in equilibrium profits increase when bidders have less
accurate signals.







Table 3.3: SF for 4 rational bidders. εi ∼ N(0, σ).
This result is consistent with a general finding that the efficiency of auctions in-
creases as bidders’ information (symmetrically) improves. For example, in a very dif-
ferent model Milgrom and Weber (1982b) analyze various information policies and show
that auctioneer revenues increase when bidders are provided better information.
3.4.2 Valuation Asymmetries
We consider two groups of bidders. The valuation advantage for Group I is held constant
(∆I), whereas this parameter is varied for bidders in Group II (∆II). Throughout this
subsection, both groups receive signals with errors generated N(0, 1).
First we examine the case with two sophisticated bidders. Starting from the sym-
metric case where ∆I = ∆II , we progressively increase the mean of the distribution for
Group II (i.e. ∆2). Remember that ∆I and ∆II are assumed to be common knowledge.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ∆I = 0.
When there is no valuation asymmetry, both bidders obviously shade the same. As
the valuation asymmetry increases we observe that the bidder with the lower valuation
is shading less while the bidder with the higher valuation is shading more. The valuation
advantage provides space for the high-valuation bidder to increase profits by shading
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(a) 1 vs. 1 (b) 2 vs. 2
(c) 2 vs. 2
Figure 3.3: Valuation asymmetry between two groups of sophisticated bidders.
more without decreasing her probability of winning too much. The low-valuation bidder
knows that his rival is bidding more conservatively, alleviating the Winner’s Curse he
would suffer by beating a bidder with a higher valuation. This motivates more aggressive
behavior, as can be seen from the decreasing SF .
The picture changes dramatically when we have multiple bidders and thus com-
petition within each group. In Figure 3.3b we observe that Group I always shades
more (i.e. bids less) than Group II, and increasingly so as the valuation asymmetry
increases. This makes sense: competition amongst high-valuation bidders in Group II
requires low valuation bidders in Group I to bid conservatively to avoid the Winner’s
Curse. However, we also note a very interesting phenomenon: the pattern for Group II
is non-monotonic on its valuation advantage. Initially, for small valuation asymmetries
the shading factor declines (reaching a minimum at about 0.4× σ) and then increases.
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As can be seen in figure 3.3c, when valuation differences become very large the Shad-
ing Factor converges to the value for an auction with only two bidders (about 1.77).
The increasing valuation gap combined with vigorous competition between Group II
bidders requires Group I bidders to bid more cautiously to avoid the Winner’s Curse.
Put simply, when valuation differences become large, bidders in Group I become largely
irrelevant, approaching a symmetric two bidder scenario.
3.4.3 Signal Quality
Information asymmetries have been widely studied in the context of bidding for oil and
gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf. As Hendricks and Porter (2007, p. 45) put
it:
Oil and gas leases are classified into two categories. Wildcat tracts are
located in previously unexplored areas. Prior to a wildcat auction, firms are
allowed to conduct seismic studies, but they are not permitted to drill any
exploratory wells. The seismic studies provide noisy, but roughly equally
informative signals about the amount of oil and gas on a lease. We argue
that wildcat auctions are likely to satisfy the symmetry assumption on the
signal distribution. Drainage leases are adjacent to wildcat tracts where oil
and gas deposits have been discovered previously. Firms that own adjacent
tracts possess drilling information that makes them better informed about the
value of the drainage tract than other firms, who are likely to have access
only to seismic information. We argue that these auctions can be modeled by
assuming one bidder has a private, informative signal and all other bidders
have no private information.
In this section, we again consider two groups, I and II. To focus on the effect of
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the quality of the signal only, we assume that ∆I = ∆II = 0. We assume that while
bidders in Group I receive estimates with error N(0, 1), bidders on Group II receive
signals with error N(0, σ). Starting with σ = 1, we progressively improve Group II’s
signal quality — decreasing the standard deviation on their signal’s error — to study
the impact of an increasing information asymmetry. Note in the horizontal axis, that
a decreasing value implies a better signal quality for Group II.
(a) 1 bidder in G I vs. 1 bidder in G II (b) 2 bidders in G I vs. 1 bidder in G II
(c) 1 bidder in G I vs. 2 bidders in G II (d) 1 bidder in G I vs. 2 bidders in G II
Figure 3.4: The impact of an information asymmetry on optimal bids.
Figure 3.4a shows that for the case of one less informed bidder competing against
one better-informed rival, both bidding schedules roughly coincide. In equilibrium, the
better-informed bidder shades her bid just enough to get close to her less-informed rival.
Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson (1994) obtain a similar result in a somewhat different
common value auction where one uninformed bidder, who only observes a public signal,
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competes with one informed bidder who also observes a private signal of the true value.18
However, the bidding schedules no longer coincide when there are more than two
bidders, as can be seen in Figures 3.4b and 3.4c. Hendricks et al. (1994) argue that in
the case studied — bidding for OCS oil and gas leases — informed bidders collude so
that they can effectively be thought of as a single informed bidder. As for uninformed
bidders, Porter (1995, p. 18-19) points out that:
The assumption that there is only one uninformed bidder is not important,
provided that all uninformed bidders observe only public information. Then
the equilibrium distribution function G(b) characterizes the highest bid sub-
mitted by the uninformed bidders. If uninformed bidders have access to
informative private signals of V then winning is an informative event for
the informed firm (if it has less than perfect information concerning V),
and the strategy of the informed bidder depends on the potential number of
(relatively) uninformed bidders.
The number of uninformed bidders is unimportant only if they have no private
information at all, which is a strong assumption. In our model, less-informed bidders
do have a private signal of the true value, albeit a less accurate one, and therefore the
number of less-informed bidders does matter, as can be seen from the different bidding
schedules in Figure 3.4b, 3.4c, and 3.4d.
In Figure 3.4d we see that expected profits of a less-informed bidder who com-
petes with better-informed rivals rapidly vanish as the latter’s information advantage
increases. This is entirely as expected: as their information gets better, rivalry between
the better-informed bidders becomes more intense, forcing the less-informed bidder to
bid more conservatively in order to avoid the Winner’s Curse. Note that in our model,
18See also Porter (1995), and Hendricks and Porter (2007).
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the less-informed bidder does have a private signal of the true value, albeit a less accu-
rate one. Therefore, while his expected profits rapidly vanish, they are not zero.
3.4.4 Naive Bidders
In this section we illustrate the effects of naive bidders on equilibrium bidding and
expected profits of a sophisticated bidder. We consider in this section no valuation
or information advantages for any bidder, so we isolate the effect of the sophistication
asymmetry.
As defined in this paper, “naive” bidders, are aware that they need to shade somehow
their bids in order to obtain positive profits. Even though the evidence (Kagel and
Levin, 2002) suggests even experienced bidders use rules of thumb, and the model
allows us to use any shading for naive bidders, we decided to give some degree of
sophistication to the naive bidders: we allow them to understand that, the more bidders,
the more aggressive they need to bid — although always below their signal. Therefore,
we consider the competitive factor CF = SF −BF as a sensible shading for the naive
bidders.
Number of Naive Rivals
















3 0.08 0.04 0.02
4 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00
5 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Table 3.4: Expected profits for sophisticated bidders. εi ∼ N(0, 1).
For a sophisticated bidder, facing naive rivals is bad news. Table 3.4 shows the
different dimensions in which naive rivals can impact the profits of sophisticated bidders,
and the naive rivals’ margin.




















Table 3.5: Shading applied by the naive bidders, CF , in the scenarios of Table 3.4.
In each column, the number of naive rivals is kept constant while the total number
of competitors — hence the number of sophisticated bidders — varies. Moving down
in any particular column shows the competitive pressure of rational competitors.
In each row moving to the right shows, for a given number of rivals, the increased
competitive pressure as a result of replacing rational by naive competitors.
Finally, the diagonal shows what happens when a rational bidder faces a pool of
naive rivals only: profits vanish extremely fast when their number increases. The
devastating impact of naive rivals is due to the fact that they ignore the Winner’s
Curse and therefore shade less when they are facing more competitors, as can be seen
in table 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Optimal shading when all competitors are rational vs. one is naive.
Figure 3.5 shows Shading Factors for two cases: when all rivals are rational (square
marks) and when one of the rivals is naive (round marks). When facing only one
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rival, a rational bidder bids more aggressively (i.e. shades less) when facing a more
aggressive bid from a naive rival. This is because concerns about the Winner’s Curse
— which in this case is relatively weak — are dominated by competition. Facing more
rivals, the opposite holds: concerns about the Winner’s Curse dominate the impact of
increased competition. This is because a naive bidder, as shown in Table 3.5, bids more
aggressively when facing more competitors; in turn, this aggressive bidding behavior
aggravates the Winner’s Curse, requiring a more cautious bid to guard against it. In
Figure 3.5, one can clearly see what happens when a bidder fails to account for the fact
that one of her opponents is naive rather than rational: underbidding in the case of one
opponent, and overbidding in all other cases.
3.5 Conclusions and Implications
In this paper, we compute the shading factor (SF ) to obtain optimal bids in first
price sealed bid common value auctions. The SF is computed ex-ante of receiving a
signal, does not require a bounded support of either signals or bids, allow for differences
in the accuracy of bidders’ estimates, as well as firm-specific valuation differences.
Furthermore, the SF also allow for (a subset of) “naive” bidders, who fail to account
for the Winner’s Curse.
We find that our model reproduces the solution to the Bayes Nash equilibrium with
n symmetric bidders and a diffuse prior found in Hoernig and Fagandini (2018).
We also generalize Wilson’s (1984) Bias Factor (BF ) to obtain a measure of the
Winner’s Curse effect, allowing us to disentangle the SF ’s shading in two parts: the
Winner’s Curse Effect, and the competitive effect. Even though the interplay of dif-
ferent dimensions of bidder heterogeneity may lead to surprising shadings that are not
monotonic in the number of bidders, all results can be understood by analyzing how
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those two effects, the competition effect and the Winner’s Curse effect, work in opposite
directions.
The BF also enables us to suggest a plausible candidate for bids submitted by naive
bidders and to assess their impact on the expected profits of sophisticated bidders. Our
results show that this impact is devastating. Hence, a critical task in real life bidding
problems is to correctly gauge the level of sophistication of one’s competitors. Absent
specific information, it may be better to underestimate their capacities — and shade
one’s bid accordingly — rather than overestimate them and fall victim to the Winner’s
Curse. This, of course, opens a Pandora’s box of tactical opportunities, since it would
be advantageous for a sophisticated bidder to be perceived as naive. Given that bidders
in real life do not know each other’s type (rational or naive) with certainty, this opens
up an interesting line of inquiry into the incentives for sophisticated bidders to pose as
naive. Savvy rational bidders may wish to cultivate an image of being unsophisticated!
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Appendix A
Appendix Wealth and the
Principal-Agent Matching
A.1 Derivation of the Partial Model
In this Appendix I provide the detailed steps to arrive from the maximization problem
of the principal in (1.1) to the results shown in Table 1.1.
Given the simplifying assumptions in the model, it is possible to solve the problem
by using the first order approach (as the agent’s problem has a unique solution),1 the
optimal e for the agent, given a pair of a and b is given by the following condition:





Equation (A.1) implies that e = bτ . As expected, the amount of effort exerted by
1Grossman and Hart (1983) show how, under certain conditions, satisfied in this model, it can be
solved in two stages, first the agent’s problem, given the wages, and later the principal’s problem.
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the agent is increasing in the distance between the wage in the good and bad state (in
other words, the size of the bonus), as well as in the level of his ability. We can replace
then the first order condition (A.1) into the other equations of the principal’s problem
eliminating the variable b from it. The new problem for the principal is:
max
e,a
− a+ e[ξ − c′(e)] (A.2)
s.t. a+ ec′(e)− c(e) ≥ u (PC.2)
a ≥ −ω (CC.2)
This reduced problem has a particular advantage. Besides having less variables
to consider, it allow us to put the attention in the cash constraint for the agent. In
particular we are interested on how affected are the incentives when (CC.2) is relevant
for the principal’s optimization. This will be the case as long as (CC.2) is binding. We
will proceed assuming that the agent is not cash constrained, and solve the optimal
compensation scheme. This is equivalent to think that ω is big enough such that the
a obtained by maximizing subject to (PC.2) is higher than −ω. Later we will solve
the problem considering the opposite case, to finalize with the case in which both are
binding.
Let ω be such that (CC.2) is not binding. From the new participation constraint
we obtain the minimum a that would make the agent sign the contract. This a is given
by:
a = u+ c(e)− ec′(e) = u− c(e)
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The optimal a depends positively on the agent’s reservation utility but negatively
on effort. This is the most direct way in which we can observe how the cash constraint
(that forbids at some point decreasing a no matter the level of e) impedes the principal
to achieve an efficient outcome. The optimal level for a can be replaced in the objective




−u+ eξ − c(e)
Whose first order condition with respect to e is ξ = c′(e). This implies that the
marginal benefit of e should be equal to its marginal cost, which is exactly the optimality
condition in a first best situation. The solution should satisfy e∗ = τξ. It should not
be surprising to find that for higher values of the output in the good state, the higher
the contracted effort, as it happens with the agent’s talent.
The wages set by the principal are a = u− ξ2τ
2
and b = ξ. As stated previously, the
principal charges the expected surplus of the operation whereas letting the agent keep
the whole good outcome of the firm.
The expected utility for agent and principal are u+ω and ξ
2τ
2
−u (= −a) respectively.
This shows also that the agent, when not cash constrained, is unable to extract any
information rents from the principal. This result is widely known in the moral hazard
literature. The principal therefore keeps the whole surplus of the project, and she only
needs to satisfy the agent’s reservation utility. This is equivalent to a first best outcome,
when the principal has full knowledge of the agent’s actions.
To obtain these results, it is important to recall that we have assumed that equation
(CC.2) is not binding. Having an expression for a from the participation constraint
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(CC.2), we can find a condition that indicates if either the participation constraint
(PC.2) or the cash constraint (CC.2) is binding. For equation (CC.2) not to be binding





From equation (A.3) we obtain already some conclusions. The higher the agent’s
reservation utility (u) and the agent’s wealth (ω), the less likely the cash constraint
(CC) is going to be binding. In the opposite direction, the larger the size of the firm
(ξ), the more likely the cash constraint is to be binding.
Assume now that equation (CC.2) is binding. That implies immediately that a =
−ω, and given that equation (IC) hasn’t changed, b = c′(e). Replacing that in the
objective function, now the principal optimizes:
max
e
−(−ω) + e[ξ − c′(e)]
That yields as solution e∗ = τξ
2
. It is direct to see how the optimal effort has
diminished. The optimal compensation scheme is now given by a = −ω and b = ξ
2
.
The expected utility for the agent and the principal are ξ
2τ
8




An interesting result is that the agent’s expected utility is decreasing in ω and
increasing in ξ. Remember that the higher ω, the less possibilities has the agent to
extract information rents from the principal. Looking to the principal, ũp is increasing
in both ω and ξ.
Finally there is the situation in which both constraints PC and CC are binding (IC
must always be binding with asymmetric information). In this case, we determine the
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optimal level of effort without having to maximize the principal’s utility, as this level is
determined by the system of equations given by the PC, CC and IC. We obtain that




Equation (A.4) implies that e is increasing in ω, τ , and u. As the participation
constraint is binding, the agent is still getting the expected utility u. However, as
a = −ω, a is decreasing in the agent’s wealth, and therefore the effectively paid bonus
should increase. As it can be observed, to implement higher levels of effort it is necessary
to have higher values of b as well. As consequence the expected bonus increases in ω,
compensating the agent for the decrease in his fixed pay a and keeping his utility at u.
Conversely, decreasing the agent’s wealth implies a higher fixed wage a, and therefore
for the agent to obtain his reservation utility, a lower bonus is required implementing
a lower level of effort. The principal suffers by having to implement lower levels of
effort (compared to first best) and paying a higher fixed compensation, decreasing her
expected utility (as she is getting lower probability of receiving ξ). The principal’s
expected utility can be written as:
E[up|CC and PC binding] = ξ
√
(u+ ω)2τ − 2u− ω
It is very important to recall that when the CC is binding for the agent, the PC
must be satisfied, so the agent is always getting u or more. This implies that the agent
is always at least as good (always weakly better) when he is cash constrained. On
the opposite side, the principal is getting all the surplus when the agent is not cash
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constrained.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In this Appendix I explore if the conditions which are sufficient to have generalized
increasing differences (GID) are satisfied by the principal-agent model developed in the
main text. The utility possibility frontier (UPF) generated by the original model is:




− ω u u





(u+ ω)2τ − 2u− ω ξ2τ
2
− u
Table A.1: Utility Possibility Frontier.
In this UPF E[v] represents the utility obtained from the principal after signing
the contract with the agent. Each column represents the situation in which the agent
is cash constrained, but the participation constraint is not binding, when the cash
constraint and the participation constraint are both binding, and finally when only the
participation constraint is binding. The relation between the variables that define in
what situation we are, is given by the base wage determined when the agent is not
cash constrained, against his wealth. If the fixed part of the optimal wage, assume an
cash unconstrained agent, is lower than his minus wealth, then the agent is not cash









, so φ (ξ, θ, u) =
ξ2τ
2




. Note that this condition is equivalent to u ≤ ξ2τ
2
− ω when
looked from the point of view of u.
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With that, φ() can be written as:
























Which is above written as a function of ξ. This function is continuous in ξ. In order
to be differentiable, let’s look at its derivatives:






















The derivatives coincide in each interval, and therefore φ is differentiable in ξ. It
remains to answer if ∂φ/∂ξ is differentiable in u, ω, and τ .







if u+ ω < ξ
2τ
8√
(u+ ω)2τ if ξ
2τ
8
≤ u+ ω < ξ2τ
2
ξτ if u+ ω ≥ ξ2τ
2









respectively. Therefore it is not differentiable in u+ ω.
However, it is necessary that ∂φ/∂ξ is increasing in u which it is. As the function
98 APPENDIX A. APPENDIX WEALTH AND THE P-A MATCHING
is continuous, and increasing in u inside each interval, then ∂φ/∂ξ is increasing in
u+ ω, which implies that it is increasing in u and ω.
A.2.2 ∂φ/∂ξ for τ




ξτ if τ ≤ 2(u+ω)
ξ2√
(u+ ω)2τ if 2(u+ω)
ξ2




if τ > 8(u+ω)
ξ2





respectively. All of them positive, and therefore ∂φ/∂ξ is increasing in τ in each
interval. This added to continuity gives that ∂φ/∂ξ is increasing in τ .
A.2.3 GID
The sufficiency conditions expressed in corollary 1 in Legros and Newman (2007, p.
1083) are:
• For GID in ξ and ω,
∂2φ(ξ, θ, u)
∂ξ∂ω




• For GID in ξ and τ ,
∂2φ(ξ, θ, u)
∂ξ∂τ




In their proof, they use ∂2φ/∂ξ∂ω or ∂2φ/∂ξ∂τ to obtain that the derivative of φ
with respect to ξ is increasing in the agent’s type and utility (Legros and Newman, 2007,
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p.1097). Even though this function is not twice differentiable in the model presented
here, we have shown that it is increasing in all the necessary variables and therefore
the model in this economy satisfies GID in ξ, ω and ξ, τ .
100 APPENDIX A. APPENDIX WEALTH AND THE P-A MATCHING
Appendix B
Appendix Hunting with two Bullets
B.1 Baseline Model
B.1.1 Perfect Information
In this appendix I solve the problem with perfect information. For simplicity and
without loss of generality I assume eh = 1. For the same reason, I solve the problem
assuming the agent owns the firm, or conversely, the principal exerts the effort. Because
of this assumption, the maximization problem lacks considerations about the wage
schedule. The maximization problem is:
max
(e1,e2)
p(e1)yh − e1 + e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)yh − β}
There is no need to compare all the strategies for a given pair of β and yh. For
example, if e1 = 1, we know that if yh ≥ β, then the agent will always exert effort for
e2, and therefore the strategy (1, 0) will never be followed.
1 Conversely, if yh < β the
1Note that if yh ≥ β, given ŷ = 0 it is always optimal to exert e2 = 1, as the revenues (yh) are
higher that the cost of that effort.
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agent will never exert effort in his second chance, and therefore the strategy (1, 1) should
never be considered. We can say even more, as yh < β ⇒ yh < βp1 , we can also discard
(0, 1) from the possibilities.2 With this information, we can define a correspondence,
relating values of β to strategies to be implemented for some value of yh.
The agent will stick with a strategy involving e2 6= 0 if, after observing ŷ = 0, the
return of exerting effort again is positive. In practical terms (0, 1) will be optimal after
observing ŷ = 0 if and only if p1yh > β1. In the same way (1, 1) will be optimal after
observing ŷ = 0 if and only if yh > β1.




critical points can be described in the diagram in Figure B.1.
0
(0, 0), (1, 0)
β
(0, 0), (1, 0)
(1, 1) β
p1
(0, 0), (1, 0)
(0, 1), (1, 1) yh
Figure B.1: Strategies to be considered, for some level of yh, given β.
Figure B.1 shows which strategies are profitable as a function of yh given β. We can
say more though. If it is rational to exert effort in the second period, given effort in the
first period (which implies that the probability of success is now 1), then not exerting
effort in the second period given effort in the first period will never be played. In the
same way it can be argued that, if it is rational to exert effort in the second period,
given no effort in the first period (which implies that the probability of success is now
p1), then it is not rational to exert no effort in the first period without exerting effort
in the second period. The new graphical description is in Figure B.2.
Comparing the profits between each pair, we can find the intervals that are relevant.
1. For the first interval (0, 0) versus (≥) (1, 0),
2Note that if yh < β then, given e1, the expected revenues of e2 = 1 are p1yh, which is lower than
β.
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0
(0, 0), (1, 0)
β
(0, 0), (1, 1)
β
p1
(0, 1), (1, 1)
yh
Figure B.2: Strategies that can be implemented for different levels of yh.




2. For the second interval (0, 0) versus (≥) (1, 1),
p0yh ≥ yh − 1− (1− p1)β
1 + (1− p1)β
1− p0
≥ yh
3. For the final interval (0, 1) versus (≥) (1, 1),
p0yh + (1− p0)[p1yh − β] ≥ yh − 1− (1− p1)β
1− (p1 − p0)β ≥ yh(1− p0)(1− p1)
1− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1)
≥ yh
The next step is to check which of the strategy sets is empty.
Name the intervals from left to right as A, B, C, etc.
It is clear that set A is nonempty. For B to be nonempty, it is necessary that:
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0
(0, 0) (1, 0)
β
(0, 0) (1, 1)
β
p1











For C to be nonempty, it is necessary:
β ≤ 1 + (1− p1)β
1− p0
(1− p0)β ≤ 1 + (1− p1)β
β ≤ 1
p1 − p0
From here we get that B and C are mutually exclusive sets. Now for D to be
nonempty,




p1 + p1(1− p1)β ≤ (1− p0)β
p1 ≤ β[(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)]
The only way this could hold is if (1 − p0) − p1(1 − p1) > 0, which happens when
p0 < 1 − p1 + p21. As p0 < p1 by assumption, the last inequality always holds, and
therefore the condition for D being non empty is:
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p1
(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)
≤ β
For E to be nonempty:
β
p1
≤ 1− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1)
β ≤ p1
(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)
So again, E and D are mutually exclusive. One more comparison I want to show is
that indeed or B or C is always empty.
1
p1 − p0
≤ 1 + (1− p1)β
1− p0
p0(p1 − 1) ≤ (1− p1)2
Which always holds. Finally, analyzing the relationship between these two impor-





(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)
1− p0 − p1 + p21 > p21 − p1p0
1 > p0(1− p1) + p1
Which always holds, for being the right-hand side a convex combination of something
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strictly lower than 1, and 1.
For a given effort level eh, the optimal contracts with moral hazard would exclude
the combination A-C-E-F but consider only A-B-E-F, A-B-D-F, and A-C-D-F.
In Figure 2.2 it is represented the contract with full information. As can be seen
in the derivation, this was done as if the principal and the agent were the same single
person. Also the two key betas have been labeled as β1 =
p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1) and β1 =
1
p1−p0 .
B.1.2 Moral Hazard and Unaware Principal
When the principal is unaware of the possibilities of the agent, she will offer a contract
with wh =
1
p1−p0 as the wage for a successful project, and w0 = 0 otherwise.
In the agent’s best response, this is exactly the division between (0, 0) and (1, 0),
and as the contour of the (0, 0) region is increasing, it happens that, for wh = 1/(p1−p0)
the agent never chooses (0, 0), independently of the value of β.
Moreover, by equalizing the frontier between (0, 1) and (1, 1) when β < β
1
, we obtain




1− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1)
β̃ =
(p1 − p0)− (1− p0)(1− p1)
(p1 − p0)2
If β < β̃, the agent’s strategy is (0, 1), if β ≥ β̃, the agent’s strategy is (1, 1), and if
β > β1 the agent chooses (1, 0).
B.1.3 Moral Hazard
For the contract under moral hazard what was considered interim rationality constraint
in the case with perfect information, is now an additional incentive compatibility. First,
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it is necessary that the agent accepts a wage that will make him choose the strategy
at t = 0 as decided the principal, but later it is further necessary that after the first
realization he sticks with that strategy. Again this would imply that wh ≥ βeh for
(eh, eh) and wh ≥ βehp1 for (0, eh), while the opposite should be true for (eh, 0) and (0, 0)
respectively.
The maximization problem for the principal is now:
max
wh,(e1,e2)
p(e1){yh − wh}+ e2[1− p(e1)]p(e1, 1){yh − wh}
s.t. p(e1)wh − e1 + e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)wh − β} ≥ 0
(e1, e2) ∈ arg max
(ê1,ê2)
p(ê1)wh − ê1 + ê2[1− p(ê1)]{p(ê1, 1)wh − β}
The first constraint is the participation constraint that will make the agent to sign
the contract at t = 0. The second constraint is going to make the agent to choose the
strategy (e1, e2) that the principal desires.
The minimum necessary wage for each strategy, which satisfies all the constraints is
given by the solution to the problem under perfect information, recalling though that










(0, 0) p0yh p0yh p0yh








[p0 + (1− p0)p1] - -
(1, 1) yh − 1−β(p1−p0)(1−p0)(1−p1) yh −
1+(1−p1)β
1−p0 yh − β
Table B.1: Expected profits for principal for each feasible strategy according to β, with
moral hazard.
We then can separate the three cases, each one of them represented in a column.
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The most complex is the first column while the simplest is the second column.
1. β ≤ p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1)







(p0 + (1− p0)p1)
β
(










[p0 + (1− p0)p1] ≥ yh −












p0 + p1(1− p0)
p1
]
(c) (0, 0) versus (1, 1),
p0yh ≥ yh −





− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)2(1− p1)
The intersection of the constraints is at
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β =
p21
−p20(p1 − 1)2 + p0(p21 − 3p1 + 1) + p1(p21 − p1 + 1)
2. p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1) ≤ β ≤
1
p1−p0
This is achieved by comparing the two implementable contracts that are at hand:
p0yh ≥ yh −
1 + (1− p1)β
1− p0
yh ≤


























(1− p1)(p1 − p0)
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(c) (0, 0) versus (1, 1),








With a Cash Unconstrained Agent
In this appendix, I will develop the model with moral hazard, but assuming that the
agent is no longer cash constrained.
The maximization problem for the principal is now:
max
(wh,w0),(e1,e2)
− w0 + p(e1){yh − (wh − w0)}+ e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)[yh − (wh − w0)]}
s.t. w0 − e1 + p(e1)(wh − w0) + e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)(wh − w0)− β} ≥ 0
(e1, e2) ∈ arg max
(ê1,ê2)
w0 − ê1 + p(ê1)(wh − w0) + ê2[1− p(ê1)]{p(ê1, 1)(wh − w0)− β}
From where we can replace the participation constraint in the objective function and
the incentive compatibility constraint. We obtain the following maximization problem:
max
(e1,e2)
− e1 + p(e1)yh + e2(1− p(e1))[p(e1, 1)yh − β]
Replacing the participation constraint in the first incentive compatibility cancels all
the terms, once the optimal must be in the arg max and therefore they should coincide.
As wh and w0, the principal will choose the effort levels such that the objective function
is satisfied, and therefore the effort choice will coincide with the one in the case with
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full information. He then can adjust the wh and w0 to satisfy all the constraints, in
particular, the second incentive compatibility.
B.2 Externality
B.2.1 Full information
In this appendix we repeat the process followed for the baseline contract with full
information, but including the externality effect ξ. It will be clear that including this
externality will imply a shift to the left on the frontiers between strategies. For space-
saving reasons, I will omit several steps that are already clarified in Appendix B.1.
The agent/principal will stick with a strategy involving e2 6= 0 if after observing
ŷ = 0 the return of exerting effort (again) is positive. In practical terms, the strategy
(0, eh) will be optimal after observing ŷ = 0, if and only if p1yh > βeh + ξ. In the same
way (eh, eh) will be optimal after observing ŷ = 0 if and only if yh > βeh + ξ.




critical points can be described in the diagram in figure B.4.
0
(0, 0), (1, 0)
β + ξ
(0, 0), (1, 1)
β+ξ
p1
(0, 1), (1, 1)
yh
Figure B.4: Strategies that can be implemented for different levels of yh.
Comparing the profits between each pair, we can find the intervals that are relevant.
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2. For the second interval (0, 0) versus (≥) (1, 1),
1 + (1− p1)(β + ξ)
1− p0
≥ yh
3. For the final interval (0, 1) versus (≥) (1, 1),
1− (β + ξ)(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1)
≥ yh
The next step is to check if any of the strategy sets is empty.
0
(0, 0) (1, 0)
β + ξ
(0, 0) (1, 1)
β+ξ
p1







Figure B.5: Strategies that can be implemented for different levels of yh.
Name the intervals from left to right as A, B, C, etc.
It is clear that set A is nonempty. For B to be nonempty, it is necessary that:
1
p1 − p0
≤ β + ξ
For C to be nonempty it is necessary:
β + ξ ≤ 1
p1 − p0
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From here we get that B and C are mutually exclusive sets. Now for D to be
nonempty,
p1
(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)
≤ (β + ξ)
For E to be non-empty:
β + ξ ≤ p1
(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)
So again, E and D are mutually exclusive.
For a given effort level eh, the optimal contracts with moral hazard would exclude
the combination A-C-E-F, but consider only A-B-E-F, A-B-D-F, and A-C-D-F.
In Figure 2.5 it is represented the contract with full information and the externality.
As can be seen in the derivation, this was done as if the principal and the agent were





p1−p0 − ξ. The superscript E means variables considering the externality.
B.2.2 Moral Hazard
The maximization problem for the principal is:
max
wh,(e1,e2)
p(e1){yh − wh}+ e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)(yh − wh)− ξ}
s.t. p(e1)wh − e1 + e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)wh − β} ≥ 0
(e1, e2) ∈ arg max
(ê1,ê2)
p(ê1)wh − ê1 + ê2[1− p(ê1)]{p(ê1, 1)wh − β}
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The first constraint is the participation constraint that will make the agent to sign
the contract at t = 0. The second constraint is going to make the agent to choose
the strategy (e1, e2) that the principal desires. Finally, we will also require interim
rationality.
The minimum necessary wage for each strategy, which satisfies all the constraints is
given by the solution to the problem under full information, recalling though that the











(0, 0) p0yh p0yh p0yh








[p0 + (1− p0)p1]− (1− p0)ξ - -
(1, 1) yh − 1−β(p1−p0)(1−p0)(1−p1) − (1− p1)ξ yh −
1+(1−p1)β
1−p0
− (1− p1)ξ yh − β − (1− p1)ξ
Table B.2: Expected profits for principal for each feasible strategy according to β, with
moral hazard.
We then can separate the three cases, each one of them represented in a column.
The most complex is the first column while the simplest is the second column.
1. β ≤ p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1)







(p0 + (1− p0)p1)− (1− p0)ξ
yh ≤ β
(












[p0 + (1− p0)p1]− (1− p0)ξ ≥ yh −


















− p1 − p0
(1− p0)(1− p1)
ξ
(c) (0, 0) versus (1, 1),
p0yh ≥ yh −
















p21 + [p1(1− p0)(1− p1){(1− p1)p1 − (1− p0)}]ξ
[p0 + (1− p0)p1](1− p0)(1− p1) + (p1 − p0)p21
2. p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1) ≤ β ≤
1
p1−p0
This is achieved by comparing the two implementable contracts that are at hand:
p0yh ≥ yh −
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(1− p1)(p1 − p0)
+ ξ
(c) (0, 0) versus (1, 1),







The intersection of the constraints is at,
β̃2 =
p1(1− p0)
(p1 − p0)2
− (1− p1)ξ
